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Problem description
Regulated transmission system operators, (TSOs), need to anticipate generation capacity
additions and accommodate future growth when building transmission lines.
We study a TSO that maximises social welfare and a power company that maximises
profit, and analyse how the two influence each others’ investment decisions. The TSO
holds an option to invest in a new transmission line, while the power company has installed
some generation capacity but holds an option to expand. We use a real options approach
and account for game theoretic interactions to find the optimal timing and size of the two
investment decisions.
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Executive Summary
Regulated transmission system operators, (TSOs), need to anticipate generation capacity
additions and accommodate future growth when building transmission lines. Given the
last decades’ deregulation of the European power sectors, EU policymakers are facing the
challenge of achieving targets to mitigate climate change since they have relinquished control
of the power sector. This challenge has contributed to an increased need for understanding
how market participants will respond to TSOs’ investment decisions, and how TSOs can
accommodate generation expansion and increase adoption of renewable energy technologies
among power companies.
We study a market consisting of a welfare-maximising TSO and a profit-maximising
power company. The TSO holds an option to invest in a new transmission line, while the
power company has installed some generation capacity but holds an option to expand. The
proposed model captures both the investment strategies of the TSO and the power company
and accounts for the conflicting objectives and game-theoretic interactions of the distinct
agents. Taking a real options approach allows us to study the e↵ect of uncertainty on the
investment strategies and take into account timing as well as sizing flexibility.
We provide insight to TSOs by studying 1) how much welfare a TSO will forgo by
disregarding a power company’s optimal investment decision, 2) the e↵ect of uncertainty on
optimal transmission and generation investment strategies, and 3) the value of managerial
flexibility.
We find that disregarding the power company’s optimal investment decision can have
a large negative impact on social welfare for a TSO. This is because, in most cases, the
TSO will want both agents to invest in a larger capacity than what is optimal for the power
company. This implies that the TSO faces a risk of investing in transmission capacity that
will be left unused by the power company if it does not consider the power company’s optimal
capacity decision. The only time we find that the optimal capacity of the TSO is less than
that of the power company is if the TSO does not have timing flexibility and is forced to
invest at a low demand level. Then, for low uncertainties, the optimal capacity of the TSO
is dominating. Furthermore, we find that if the TSO considers only the power company’s
sizing flexibility and not the flexibility in timing, then it risks investing in a too small
capacity. This is because the power company would optimally want to delay investment,
and invest in a larger capacity than the TSO anticipates it to install if it assumes that the
power company invests at the same time as itself. We furthermore conclude that not only
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does a subsidy of the power company’s investment cost increase the optimal capacity, but
it also triggers earlier investment by the power company. Therefore, a subsidy can be used
as a tool to increase social welfare.
We find that increased demand uncertainty leads to an increase in optimal capacity
and a delay in investment because of the increased value of waiting. Also the welfare loss
from not taking the power company’s optimal investment decision into account increases in
uncertainty.
This paper extends the theoretical real options literature by considering a two-firm set-
ting with di↵erent objectives tackling both timing and capacity choice of the agents. It
provides insight into how the conflicting objectives a↵ect the optimal investment strategy
of the TSO. Therefore, it is a step in the direction of providing better policies to increase
power companies’ adoption of renewable energy technologies.
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Sammendrag
N˚ar systemansvarlig for kraftnettet tar investeringsbeslutninger knyttet til utbygging av
kraftlinjer ma˚ den ta hensyn til forventet økning i kraftselskapenes produksjon og legge
til rette for vekst. P˚a bakgrunn av de siste ti˚arenes deregulering av det europeiske kraft-
markedet st˚ar EU ovenfor en utfordring knyttet til a˚ n˚a klimama˚lene organisasjonen har satt
seg ettersom de ikke lenger kontrollerer kraftproduksjonen. Denne utfordringen har bidratt
til et økt behov for a˚ forst˚a hvordan kraftselskapene reagerer p˚a systemansvarlig sine in-
vesteringsbeslutninger, og hvordan systemansvarlig kan bidra til a˚ øke kraftproduksjonen
samt andelen kraft fra fornybare energikilder.
I denne artikkelen studerer vi et marked som best˚ar av en systemansvarlig med ma˚l om
a˚ maksimere velferd og et profittmaksimeriende kraftselskap. Systemansvarlig har en opsjon
p˚a a˚ bygge ut en kraftlinje, mens kraftselskapet har noe eksisterende produksjonskapasitet
i tillegg til en opsjon p˚a a˚ øke kapasiteten. Modellen vi har utviklet inkluderer b˚ade syste-
mansvarlig og kraftselskapets investeringsbeslutning. Videre tar den hensyn til at aktørene
har motstridende ma˚l og de spillteoretiske aspektene som oppst˚ar p˚a bakgrunn av dette.
En realopsjonstilnærming er valgt, noe som gjør det mulig a˚ studere e↵ekten av usikkerhet
samtidig som vi tar hensyn til at aktørene har fleksibilitet til a˚ bestemme b˚ade tidspunkt
for og størrelse p˚a investeringen sin.
Vi gir systemansvarlig bedre innsikt ved a˚ undersøke 1) hvor mye velferd som vil g˚a
tapt dersom systemansvarlig ser bort fra kraftselskapets frihet til a˚ ta sin egen invester-
ingsbeslutning b˚ade med tanke p˚a tid og kapasitet, 2) hvordan usikkerhet p˚avirker hver
av de to akørenes optimale investeringsstrategier, og 3) verdien av fleksibilitet knyttet til
investeringsbeslutningen for begge aktører.
Vi finner at dersom systemansvarlig ignorerer kraftselskapets frihet til a˚ velge tidspunkt
og størrelse p˚a investeringen sin vil det ha en betydelig negativ innvirkning p˚a velferd.
Dette fordi systemansvarlig som regel vil at kraftselskapet skal investere i en høyere kap-
asitet enn det som er optimalt for kraftselskapet med tanke p˚a profitt. Dermed risikerer
systemansvarlig a˚ investere i kraftlinjekapasitet som ikke vil bli benyttet av kraftselskapet
hvis den ser bort fra kraftselskapets frihet til a˚ bestemme sin egen kapasitet. Unntaket er
n˚ar systemansvarlig ikke kan velge tidspunkt for sin egen investering, men ma˚ investere ved
et lavt etterspørselsniv˚a. For lav usikkerhet vil da systemansvarligs optimale kapasitet være
lavere enn den optimale kapasiteten til kraftselskapet. P˚a den annen side finner vi at hvis
systemansvarlig kun tar hensyn til at kraftselskapet har mulighet til a˚ bestemme størrelsen
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p˚a kapasitetsutvidelsen, men ikke at det har mulighet til a˚ utsette investeringen, risikerer
den a˚ bygge en kraftlinje med for lav kapasitet. Det er fordi kraftselskapet optimalt vil
utsette investeringen og investere i en høyere kapasitet enn systemansvarlig forutser hvis
den antar at kraftselskapet investerer p˚a samme tidspunkt som seg selv. Videre konkluderer
vi med at et subsidie av kraftselskapets investeringskostand ikke bare vil føre til at det er
optimalt for kraftselskapet a˚ investere i en høyere kapasitet, men ogs˚a gjøre det optimalt a˚
investere p˚a et tidligere tidspunkt. Derfor kan et subsidie være et verktøy for a˚ øke velferd.
Vi finner at økt usikkerhet i etterspørsel fører til en økning i optimal kapasitet og utsatt
investering p˚a grunn av økt verdi av a˚ vente. Ogs˚a velferdstapet fra a˚ ikke ta hensyn til
kraftselskapets optimale investeringsbesluting øker med usikkerhet.
Denne artikkelen utvider den teoretiske realopsjonslitteraturen ved a˚ presentre en modell
med to aktører med ulike ma˚lsetninger. Den bidrar til innsikt knyttet til hvordan de mot-
stridende ma˚lsetningene p˚avirker systemansvarligs optimale investeringsstrategi. Arbeidet
er et skritt p˚a veien mot a˚ kunne utvikle reguleringer som vil bidra til økning av fornybar
energiproduksjon.
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Nomenclature
↵ Drift rate
 1 Positive root of the quadratic function
1
2 
2 (    1) + ↵    ⇢ = 0
  Marginal investment cost of the power company
⌘ Constant > 0 in inverse demand function
  Marginal investment cost of the TSO
⇢ Exogenous discount rate
  Volatility parameter
⌧P First time the stochastic variable ✓ hits the trigger level, ✓P , i.e., the investment
timing of the power company
⌧T First time the stochastic variable ✓ hits the trigger level, ✓T , i.e., the investment
timing of the TSO
✓P Investment trigger of the power company
✓T Investment trigger of the TSO
K0 Existing capacity of the power company
KP Capacity expansion of the power company
KT Capacity of the transmission line exceeding K0
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1 Introduction
Regulated transmission system operators, (TSOs), need to anticipate generation capacity
additions and accommodate future growth when building transmission lines. In practice,
they are responsible for keeping a balance between generation and consumption of power at
every point in time to ensure system stability (Viljanen et al., 2011). A few decades ago, all
European electricity industries were regulated, i.e., vertically integrated monopolies, which
controlled generation, retail, transmission, and distribution functions. However, deregu-
lation of most industries started early in the 1990s. The goal was to create more e cient
markets by introducing competition (Hyman, 2010). By 2002, 80% of the European electric-
ity market was opened to competition, while Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden,
and the UK had close to fully deregulated markets (Nord Pool Spot, 2015; Strauss-Kahn
and Traca, 2004). However in most countries, transmission is still regulated1.
At the same time, the European Union (EU) has been facing an increasing pressure of
meeting its targets on greenhouse gas emissions, renewable energy, and energy e ciency. In
2007, the EU’s strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-plan) was adopted as a response, to
promote research and development (R&D) of renewable energy technologies and to increase
their adoption by the market (Huemer, 2012). But, given the deregulation of energy sectors
in most EU member states, power companies will only adopt renewable energy technolo-
gies if they contribute to their profit-maximising incentives. Thus, when trying to achieve
its targets to mitigate climate changes, the EU policymakers face the challenge of having
committed to achieve certain environmental standards, while at the same time having re-
linquished control of the power sector. Furthermore, since renewable technologies like wind,
hydro, and solar power are typically geographically dispersed, power companies will invest
in such technologies only if there is transmission line capacity available in their geographical
area (Kassakian et al., 2011). Transmission investment decisions, however, are typically
made by regulated welfare-maximising TSOs. These challenges have contributed to an in-
creased need for understanding how market participants will respond to TSOs’ investment
decisions and governmental policies, as the EU can no longer influence the power companies’
investment decisions directly. As of today, most policy-enabling models of the EU energy
1Transmission may be characterized as a natural monopoly (Nelson and Primeaux, 1988). Natural
monopolies often arise when fixed costs represent a fundamental proportion of total costs, and they as
a consequence are more e cient if operated by a unique player rather than having competitive systems
(Rudnick et al., 1995).
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system overlook that TSOs and power companies have di↵erent objectives, which may lead
to flawed market designs2.
We study a market consisting of one TSO and one power company. The TSO holds an
option to invest in a new transmission line, while the power company has installed some
generation capacity but holds an option to expand. The power company is dependent on
the TSO to invest in grid lines so that it can transmit its power, while the TSO is dependent
on the power company as the amount of power transmitted to the market is equal to the
production of the power plant. We take into account that the two agents have conflicting
objectives as the TSO maximises social welfare while the power company maximises profit.
Furthermore, we introduce uncertainty into the model by assuming that future demand is
stochastic and consider both optimal timing and size of the two investments. The problem
has similarities to a Stackelberg game with the TSO as the leader and the power company
as the follower. However in our case, the agents are dependent on each other instead of
competing on market share. We solve the problem by taking a real options approach that
accounts for game-theoretic interactions. Therewith, we contribute to the theoretical real
options literature as, to our best knowledge, we are the first to consider a two-firm setting
with di↵erent objectives tackling both timing and capacity choice of the agents.
Besides this theoretical contribution, the main goal of the thesis is to provide insights
into optimal transmission investment decisions by studying 1) how much welfare a TSO
will forgo by disregarding a power company’s optimal investment decision, 2) the e↵ect of
uncertainty on optimal transmission and generation investment strategies, and 3) the value
of managerial flexibility.
We find that if the TSO disregards the power company’s optimal investment decision it
can have a large negative impact on social welfare. In most cases, the TSO will want both
agents to invest in a larger capacity than what is optimal for the power company. Therefore,
the TSO faces a risk of investing in transmission capacity that will be left unused by the
power company if it does not consider the power company’s optimal capacity decision. On
the contrary, we find that if the TSO considers only the power company’s sizing flexibility
and not the flexibility in timing, then it risks investing in a too small capacity. This is
because the power company would optimally want to delay investment, and invest in a
2E.g., the MARKAL model does not take into account this aspect (Loulou et al., 2004). As of 2011,
this model was adapted for use in many countries, including the UK, the US, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Australia and Germany (Department of Energy & Climate Change UK, 2011).
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larger capacity than the TSO anticipates it to install if it assumes that the power company
invests at the same time as itself. Furthermore, we conclude that not only does a subsidy
of the power company’s investment cost increase the optimal capacity, but it also triggers
earlier investment by the power company. Therefore, a subsidy can be used as a tool to
increase social welfare.
Moreover, we find that increased demand uncertainty leads to an increase in optimal
capacity and a delay in investment because of the increased value of waiting. Also the
welfare loss from not taking the PC’s optimal investment decision into account increases in
uncertainty.
The study contributes to an improved understanding of how conflicting objectives a↵ect
the optimal investment strategy of both agents, and the social welfare loss that might occur
if TSOs do not anticipate the response of power companies to their investment decisions.
The study is a step in the direction of providing better policies to increase power companies’
adoption of renewable energy technologies.
We proceed in Section 2 by discussing related literature. In Section 3, we first introduce
the assumptions and notation and then formulate the model. In Section 4, the solution
approach used to solve the model is described. In Section 5, the analytical expressions for the
investment thresholds, corresponding optimal capacities, and the resulting value functions
given the possible outcomes of the game are derived. In Section 6, we present numerical
results and highlight the economic insight the model provides. Section 7 concludes the paper
and o↵ers directions for future research. Detailed derivations, proofs of propositions, as well
as analytical solutions to sub-problems that will be introduced in the model section can be
found in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
A number of existing research papers have been motivated by the deregulation of power
markets and analyse how deregulation a↵ects the market participants’ optimal investment
decisions. Most of the existing papers use either a real options or an optimization approach.
Few real options papers consider both transmission and generation investments simulta-
neously. However, several have studied either transmission planning or generation expansion
planning. Siddiqui and Gupta (2007) analyse the e↵ects of deregulating the transmission
sector by modelling the investment decision of a private investor holding a perpetual op-
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tion to construct a transmission line. Using the real options approach, they find optimal
investment timing and line capacity under uncertain congestion rents. They compare the
cases of limited liability, i.e., the private investor does not incur losses from operating the
transmission line, and unlimited liability. Based on their analysis, they conclude that lim-
ited liability might be an e↵ective policy tool that induces private investors to invest in
transmission lines. Saphores et al. (2004) study a firm that must undergo a costly and
time-consuming regulatory process before investing in a transmission line. They consider
optimal timing of the stepwise investment, and find that the optimal start of the regulatory
review and the project construction depend on the project benefits and the duration of the
regulatory review. Boyle et al. (2006) set out a simple analytical framework for incorporat-
ing real options in transmission investment decisions but do not address directly the issue
of coordination between generation investment and transmission investment. They treat
new generation assets as exogenous, i.e., current and projected transmission investments do
not influence generation investments. Botterud et al. (2005) present a stochastic dynamic
investment model for investments in power generation under both centralised social welfare
and decentralised profit objectives. However, they analyse generation without taking trans-
mission capacity into account. Additional to these papers, we consider the interrelation
between transmission line and generation investments.
Several papers based on optimisation models including game-theoretic aspects conclude
that the interrelation between generation and transmission investments should be consid-
ered. Sauma and Oren (2006) include game-theoretic aspects and evaluate the welfare
implications of transmission investments based on equilibrium models. They take into ac-
count the competitive interaction among generation firms whose decisions in generation
capacity investments and production are a↵ected by both transmission investments and
the congestion management protocols of the TSO. Their analysis shows that both the size
of the welfare gains associated with transmission investments and the location of the best
transmission investments might change when the generation expansion response is taken
into account.
Sauma and Oren (2007) formulate transmission planning as an optimisation problem
using a multistage game-theoretic framework. They consider alternative conflicting objec-
tives and investigate the policy implications of divergent expansion plans resulting from the
planner’s level of anticipation of strategic responses. They assume that there are several com-
peting power companies maximising profit, and a TSO whose objective is to maximise social
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welfare while satisfying transmission constraints. Their study shows that optimal transmis-
sion expansion plans may be very sensitive to supply and demand parameters. Based on
this observation, they also conclude that interrelation between generation and transmission
investments should be taken into account when evaluating transmission investment projects.
Other optimisation papers have also considered both transmission and generation plan-
ning. One example is Maurovich-Horvat et al. (2015). They compare two markets designs
using two bi-level optimisation models. One model with a welfare-maximising TSO and an-
other one with a profit-maximising merchant investor (MI) making transmission investment
decisions, while generation investments are determined by wind power companies. They find
that social welfare is always higher when the TSO decides transmission investments because
the MI has incentives to boost congestion rents by restricting capacities of the transmission
lines, which also limits investment in wind power by producers.
Baringo and Conejo (2012) also use a bi-level optimisation model and consider both
transmission and generation investments. They however consider a welfare-maximising TSO
at the upper level making both transmission and wind investment decisions. In addition to
them, we take into account that in a deregulated market these investment decisions are
typically made by di↵erent agents with conflicting objectives.
Compared to Sauma and Oren (2006), Sauma and Oren (2007), Maurovich-Horvat et al.
(2015), and Baringo and Conejo (2012), we consider a continuous-time framework and
introduce uncertainty into our model. This allows us to consider the timing of investment
in addition to capacity. However, in our model, we consider only one power company and
not several competing power companies like done in these papers.
In addition to the energy-specific papers mentioned, a range of other real options papers
are relevant for our work. The theory of real options determines the optimal time to invest in
a given capacity and find that uncertainty generates a value of waiting. Recent contributions
in addition determine the optimal size of the investment (Dangl, 1999; Bøckman et al., 2008;
Hagspiel et al., 2010; Sarkar, 2011; Chronopoulos et al., 2015). A general result obtained is
that when uncertainty increases, firms invest later in a larger capacity. As an example, Dangl
(1999) discusses an investment problem in which a profit-maximising firm has to determine
both optimal investment timing and optimal capacity choice. He finds that uncertainty
in future demand leads to an increase in optimal installed capacity and causes investment
to be delayed. Furthermore, our problem is similar to sequential investment problems like
Kort et al. (2010) and Chronopoulos et al. (2015) but unlike them we consider that the two
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investments undertaken at distinct points in time are made by two di↵erent agents with
conflicting objectives.
Due to the strategic aspect arising in our problem, game-theoretic papers are also relevant
for our work (Huberts et al., 2015; Kamoto and Okawa, 2014; Huisman and Kort, 2014).
Huisman and Kort (2014) extend the literature that considers both timing and capacity by
including competition. They consider both a monopoly and a duopoly case and analyse
timing and capacity decisions simultaneously. They find that the capacity level of a social
planner is twice the level of the monopolist and that both agents invest in a larger capacity
when uncertainty increases. As in Huisman and Kort (2014), we consider two di↵erent
agents. However, compared to Huisman and Kort (2014), the two agents are not competing
on market share. Rather, they are dependent on each other’s investment decision both with
regards to timing and sizing. Still, one can argue that competition arises in the sense that
they have conflicting objectives.
Sinha et al. (2013) consider a similar problem as ours, including a regulating authority
and a mining company. Their objectives are conflicting as the regulating authority strives
to maximise social welfare through higher taxes and pollution reduction, while the mining
company is profit-maximising. This leads to a Stackelberg competition with the regulating
authority as the leader. The leader has a first-mover advantage as it can set a tax structure
that directly a↵ects the follower’s profit and, thus, its investment decision. The problem
is solved as a bi-level optimisation problem. Because of extensions they introduce to the
model, they do not handle the problem using an analytical approach but rather a bilevel
evolutionary algorithm. Our problem di↵ers from Sinha et al.’s (2013) as the TSO’s in-
vestment decision does not directly a↵ect the power company’s profit or investment cost
and, thus, neither the investment decision. The TSO only sets lower and upper bounds
on the power company’s timing and capacity choice, respectively. In addition to Sinha
et al. (2013), we introduce uncertainty into the model and derive analytical solutions for
the optimal investment strategies.
Review of existing literature reveals a gap in the literature within the field of real options.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider a two-firm setting with di↵erent
objectives solving for optimal investment strategy for both the leader and the follower with
respect to timing and size of investment.
6
3 Model Assumptions and Problem Formulation
We consider two decision makers, a TSO and a power company (PC), that serve a market
characterised by uncertain demand. The TSO holds an option to invest in a new trans-
mission line to connect the capacity of the PC to the main grid and has the flexibility to
choose both size and timing of the investment. The PC currently has installed a generation
capacity of size K0 and holds an option to expand. However, the PC receives no profit
before the TSO undertakes its investment as we assume that there is no transmission ca-
pacity available before the new transmission line is installed3. Assuming existing capacity is
reasonable as renewable energy sources often are located in remote places were the existing
grid is limited and must be replaced in order to meet higher levels of demand. Also, the PC
has timing and sizing flexibility with regards to the possible future expansion. Both invest-
ments are considered to be irreversible as transmission lines and power plants tend to have
low residual values. The problem is similar to a sequential investment problem but with two
di↵erent agents investing at each step. Moreover, the two agents have di↵erent objectives.
The TSO strives to maximise social welfare, while the PC maximises profit. We assume
perfect information implying that the TSO can anticipate the investment decision of the
PC. This adds strategic aspects to the problem, which will influence the TSO’s investment
strategy since we assume that the TSO makes its investment decision before the PC. There-
fore, the problem is similar to a Stackelberg game with the TSO as the leader and the PC
as the follower. However, as transmission capacity complements generation capacity rather
than substituting it (Chao and Wilson, 2012), the considered problem does not have the
same competitive aspects as the traditional Stackelberg model where companies compete
on market share. Instead, each agent’s value is dependent on the other agent’s investment
decision. The PC is dependent on the TSO to invest in grid lines so that it can transmit its
power, while the TSO is dependent on the PC as the amount of power transmitted to the
market is equal to the production of the PC. Still, a competitive aspect arises in the sense
that they have conflicting objectives they both want to achieve.
The power plant and the transmission line serve stochastic demand given by the following
3In reality there would most likely be an old transmission line available to transmit the initial capacity
of the PC before the new transmission line is installed. However, we assume this is not the case as we want
to focus on the investment decision of the TSO. Relaxing this assumption would complicate our already
complex problem.
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inverse demand function4:
P (✓t, K) = ✓t(1  ⌘K), (1)
where ✓t is a stochastic demand shift parameter, ⌘ > 0 is a constant, and K is the capacity
of the power plant. We consider a continuous-time framework where the stochastic demand
shift parameter is assumed to undergo multiplicative geometric Brownian Motion (GBM)
shocks, i.e., {✓t, t   0} follows a stochastic process of the form:
d✓t = ↵✓tdt+  ✓tdWt, (2)
where ↵ 2 < is the trend parameter or drift,   2 <+ is the volatility parameter, and dWt
is an increment of a Wiener process. The current value of the demand parameter is known
to the agents, but future values are uncertain and assumed to be log-normally distributed.
The stochastic demand shift parameter introduces uncertainty into the investment problem.
Furthermore, ⇢ is the exogenously given discount rate. We assume that ⇢ > ↵ as otherwise it
would never be optimal to invest. Then, both agents would prefer to wait forever. Further-
more, we assume that the PC produces up to capacity5, K. As we want to focus on deciding
optimal timing and size of the investments, and already consider a very complex problem,
we refer to Dangl (1999), Sarkar (2009), and Chicu (2012) for further insight into volume
flexibility. For ease of notation, production costs are assumed to be implicitly included in
the investment cost as the results do not qualitatively depend on them. Also, we assume
that the TSO charges the PC no tari↵s for transmitting power. Thus, the continuous profit
flow of the PC is equal to:
⇡(✓t, K) = P (✓t, K)K. (3)
The TSO has to invest in a capacity greater than or equal to K0. KT denotes the trans-
mission capacity exceeding K0. Using this notation, the total capacity of the transmission
line is equal to K0 + KT after the transmission investment is undertaken. Similarly, we
4A multiplicative demand function is chosen, i.e., current and future prices depend on the capacity of the
PC and, therefore, on the investment decision. This implies an upper bound on quantity, being independent
of ✓t, in order to guarantee a positive output price (Boonman and Hagspiel, 2013). See Boonman and
Hagspiel (2013) for a broader discussion on demand functions.
5This assumption is often called the ’market clearance assumption’, and is widely used in the literature,
e.g., in Chod and Rudi (2005), Anand and Girotra (2007), Goyal and Netessine (2007), and Boonman et al.
(2015).
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define KP as the size of the PC’s capacity expansion. Then, the total capacity of the PC is
K0 before expansion, and K0 +KP after expansion. As we do not allow for disinvestment,
i.e., reduction of the generation and transmission capacity below K0, we require both KP
and KT to be positive.
Similar to Sauma and Oren (2007), Huisman and Kort (2014) or Boonman et al. (2015),
we assume investment costs for both agents to be linear in capacity. Moreover, we assume
that the TSO and the PC face di↵erent marginal investment costs. The total investment
cost, including operating costs for the TSO, is assumed to be  (K0 + KT ), while the PC
faces an investment cost, including production costs, of  KP . Note that the PC has already
installed a capacity of K0.
As the TSO’s objective is to maximise social welfare, we need to define total surplus.
Like Sauma and Oren (2006) and Maurovich-Horvat et al. (2015), we define total surplus
as the sum of the consumer and producer surplus net of investment costs for both agents.
Regarding investment timing, we distinguish two possible cases. In case 1, the PC invests
later than the TSO, i.e., the investment threshold of the PC, ✓P , is higher than that of the
TSO, ✓T . In case 2 the PC invests at the same time as the TSO. The first case will result
in three regions, see Figure 1. In the first region, both companies are waiting to invest. In
the second region, only the TSO has invested, and an amount of power equal to K0 is being
generated and transmitted. In the last region, the PC has increased its generation capacity
by KP , which contributes to increased total surplus of the TSO and additional profit for
the PC, respectively. In case 2 we distinguish only two regions, where both agents have
invested in the second region and an amount of power equal to K0 +KP is being generated
and transmitted, see Figure 2.
Therewith we can formulate the investment problems of the TSO and the PC. First, the
1 2 3
✓t
✓T , K0 +KT ✓P , KP
Both investedBoth waiting
TSO invested
PC waiting
Figure 1: In Region 1, both agents are waiting to invest. In Region 2, the TSO has installed
a transmission line with capacity K0 + KT , however, K0 is the amount of power being
transmitted. In Region 3, the PC has expanded its capacity by KP and generates and
transmits an amount of power equal to K0 +KP .
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1 2
✓t
✓T ,K0 +KT , KP
Both investedBoth waiting
Figure 2: In Region 1, both agents are waiting to invest. In Region 2, both the TSO and
the PC have invested and an amount of power equal to K0 + KP is being generated and
transmitted.
TSO’s investment problem at time zero is equal to the following optimal stopping problem:
sup
⌧T

max
KT
E
 Z 1
s=⌧T
e ⇢sts(✓s, K0)ds  e ⇢⌧T  (K0 +KT )+Z 1
s=⌧P
e ⇢s[ts(✓s, K0 +KT )  ts(✓s, K0)]ds  e ⇢⌧P  KT
   ✓0  , (4)
where ts(.) denotes the continuous part of total surplus, which is equal to the sum of the
continuous parts of the consumer and producer surplus. The first part of Equation (4)
is the present value of the total surplus if the PC produces at capacity K0 forever. The
second part denotes the present value of the additional total surplus if the PC expands its
capacity to KP = KT at time ⌧P . The inner optimisation problem states that the TSO at
the moment of investment will choose the capacity that maximises the present value of total
surplus given that it can choose the size of the PC’s capacity expansion, i.e., KP = KT .
In reality, the PC has flexibility to decide its optimal capacity but to solve for the optimal
capacity of the TSO, one needs to solve the problem as if the PC will install the TSO’s
optimal capacity. The outer optimisation problem corresponds to the flexibility of choosing
the optimal time to invest in the transmission line.
The solution to the optimal stopping problem is defined by a threshold, ✓⇤T . For ✓t levels
greater than ✓⇤T , we are in the stopping region where it is optimal for the TSO to invest
immediately. For ✓t < ✓⇤T , demand is too low to undertake the investment, and it is optimal
for the TSO to wait. The TSO invests at the moment ✓t hits the optimal investment level,
✓⇤T , the first time. Thus, the optimal investment time, ⌧
⇤
T , is equal to the first time the
stochastic variable ✓ hits the optimal level, ✓⇤T ; ⌧
⇤
T ⌘ min{t : ✓t   ✓⇤T}. The corresponding
optimal capacity is denoted by K⇤T (✓
⇤
T ).
To find the expression for the total surplus, we start by deriving an expression for the
consumer surplus, see Huisman and Kort (2014) for similar derivations. The instantaneous
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Figure 3: The consumer surplus is equal to the grey area when the inverse demand curve is
given by P (✓t, K) = ✓t(1  ⌘K) and the total generation capacity of the PC is equal to K.
consumer surplus is given by
R ✓t
P (K)K(P )dP , which is illustrated by the grey area in Figure
3. K is the total generation capacity of the PC and, therefore, the amount of power being
generated and transmitted to the consumers. Since P (✓t, K) = ✓t(1   ⌘K), it holds that
K(P ) = 1⌘ (1   P✓t ). This leads to the following expression for the instantaneous consumer
surplus:
cs(✓t, K) =
Z ✓t
✓t(1 ⌘K)
1
⌘
✓
1  P
✓t
◆
dP =
1
2
✓tK
2⌘. (5)
Taking into account the three regions where either both are waiting, only the TSO has
invested or both have invested, see Figure 1, the instantaneous consumer surplus (cs) at
time t is given by:
cs(✓t, K) =
8>><>>:
0 if t  ⌧T ,
1
2✓tK
2
0⌘ if ⌧T  t  ⌧P ,
1
2✓t(K0 +KT )
2⌘ if ⌧P  t.
(6)
The instantaneous part of the producer surplus, on the other hand, is equal to the profit
flow of the PC given in Equation (3). At time t it is equal to:
ps(✓t, K) =
8>><>>:
0 if t  ⌧T ,
✓t(1  ⌘K0)K0 if ⌧T  t  ⌧P ,
✓t(1  ⌘(K0 +KT ))(K0 +KT ) if ⌧P  t.
(7)
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Therefore, the instantaneous part of total surplus is equal to:
ts(✓t, K) =
8>><>>:
0 if t  ⌧T ,
1
2✓tK
2
0⌘ + ✓t(1  ⌘K0)K0 if ⌧T  t  ⌧P ,
1
2✓t(K0 +KT )
2⌘ + ✓t(1  ⌘(K0 +KT ))(K0 +KT ) if ⌧P  t.
(8)
Given the TSO’s investment decision, the PC’s investment problem at time zero is equal
to:
sup
⌧P ⌧T

max
KPKT
E
 Z 1
s=⌧T
e ⇢s⇡(✓s, K0)ds
+
Z 1
s=⌧P
e ⇢s[⇡(✓s, K0 +KP )  ⇡(✓s, K0)]ds  e ⇢⌧P  KP
   ✓0  , (9)
where ⌧T is the moment in time when the TSO undertakes its investment. The first part
of Equation (9) is the present value of the PC if it produces at capacity K0 forever. The
second part denotes the present value of the net additional value of the PC if it expands its
capacity by KP at time ⌧P .
The inner optimisation problem corresponds to the flexibility to choose the size of the
capacity expansion that maximises the present value of the PC. It will never be optimal for
the PC to invest in a larger capacity than that of the transmission line, as it will not be
able to transmit the quantity exceeding the transmission line’s capacity to the consumers.
Hence, we have K0 + KP  K0 + KT , which gives KP  KT . The outer optimisation
problem corresponds to the flexibility to choose the optimal timing of the investment. The
investment timing of the PC is restricted by the TSO’s. As we assume that there is no
capacity available to transmit power, it does not make sense for the PC to expand capacity
before the TSO has installed the new transmission line. Consequently, ⌧P is assumed to be
greater than or equal to ⌧T . The solution to the optimal stopping problem is defined by the
threshold, ✓⇤P . The optimal investment time of the PC, ⌧
⇤
P , is equal to the first time the
stochastic variable ✓t hits the optimal level, ✓⇤P , ⌧
⇤
P ⌘ min{t : ✓t   ✓⇤P}. The corresponding
optimal capacity expansion of the PC is denoted by K⇤P (✓
⇤
P ).
In the next section, we describe the solution approach before we present the solution to
the problem in Section 5. To gain additional insight into the investment decision of a TSO,
we solve several sub-problems in addition to the full problem where we reduce the agents’
level of flexibility. An overview of each sub-problem’s level of managerial flexibility is given
in Table 1. The following sub-problems have been studied:
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• Sub-problem 1: Both agents face a now-or-never investment decision but have flexibil-
ity to choose the capacity size of investment, K⇤T and K
⇤
P .
• Sub-problem 2: Both agents have flexibility to choose the timing of their own invest-
ment given by the trigger levels ✓⇤T and ✓
⇤
P , but the TSO decides the size of both
investments, KP = K⇤T .
• Sub-problem 3: Both agents have flexibility to choose the timing of their own invest-
ment, but the PC decides the size of both investments, KT = K⇤P .
• Sub-problem 4: Both companies have sizing flexibility, K⇤T and K⇤P . The TSO has to
invest at time zero, while the PC can choose optimal timing, given by ✓⇤P .
• Sub-problem 5: Both agents have flexibility to choose sizing, K⇤T and K⇤P , respectively,
while the TSO decides timing for both, i.e., ✓P = ✓⇤T
The analytical solutions to the sub-problems are derived in Appendix C.
Timing Sizing
PC TSO PC TSO
Sub-problem 1 ✓0 ✓0 K⇤P K
⇤
T
Sub-problem 2 ✓⇤P ✓
⇤
T KP = K
⇤
T K
⇤
T
Sub-problem 3 ✓⇤P ✓
⇤
T K
⇤
P KT = K
⇤
P
Sub-problem 4 ✓⇤P ✓0 K
⇤
P K
⇤
T
Sub-problem 5 ✓P = ✓⇤T ✓
⇤
T K
⇤
P K
⇤
T
Full problem ✓⇤P ✓
⇤
T K
⇤
P K
⇤
T
Table 1: Overview of the sub-problems
4 Solution Approach
Due to the assumption of perfect information, the problem is similar to a two-stage game6.
The TSO makes its investment decision first, whereas the PC can invest at the same time
or later than the TSO. Although the agents choose to invest at the same time, it is assumed
6A game is defined as any situation in which players make strategic decisions, i.e., decisions that take
into account each other’s actions and responses (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2009).
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that the TSO is the one that decides first, i.e., the leader, and the PC is the follower. The
game is similar to a Stackelberg game since it is a sequential game with a leader and a
follower. However, it is not a traditional Stackelberg game as the agents do not compete on
quantity.
Given that the TSO has invested, the PC cannot influence the investment strategy
of the TSO but optimises its own timing and capacity based on the observed investment
decision of the TSO. This means that the PC’s investment decision includes no strategic
aspects. However, when the TSO determines its optimal investment strategy, it takes the
PC’s reaction into account. Therefore, the problem is solved backwards. First, we find the
optimal investment decision of the PC given K⇤T and ✓
⇤
T . Next, we find the optimal strategy
of the TSO while taking into account the expected response of the PC.
We derive the following remark:
Remark 1 The TSO can only a↵ect the PC’s investment decision in two ways. 1) Set-
ting a lower bound on the PC’s investment timing, ✓⇤T , which will force the PC to delay
expansion of its generation capacity if ✓⇤P is less than ✓
⇤
T . 2) Setting an upper bound on
capacity, which will a↵ect the PC’s decision if K⇤T is lower than the optimal capacity expan-
sion of the power plant, K⇤P .
Neither the PC’s profit nor its investment cost directly depend on the TSO’s investment
strategy, i.e., K⇤T or ✓
⇤
T . So, the only way that the TSO can a↵ect the PC is by restricting
the size or the timing of the PC’s investment decision through the size or timing of the
transmission line investment7. Given that the TSO installs K⇤T when ✓t hits ✓
⇤
T , the PC
will find its corresponding optimal investment decision8. The PC can choose among one of
the four decisions illustrated in Table 2. Only if decision 1 is optimal will the PC not be
bounded by either capacity or timing since the TSO will optimally invest in a larger capacity
at an earlier point in time than itself. If one of the other three decisions are optimal, then
the TSO’s choice of ✓⇤T and K
⇤
T will restrict the optimal decision of the PC.
Due to perfect information, it is the investment strategy of the TSO that eventually
7Compared to Sinha et al. (2013), we face a challenge when solving our problem. In their model, the
profit of the mining company depends directly on the leader’s decision, whereas in our model the PC’s value
is only a↵ected by the TSO’s decision through constraints, i.e., lower and upper bounds.
8Note that the investment thresholds and capacities will from now on be written without a star when
one of the agents is bounded by the optimal investment decision of the other agent.
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Decision 1 Decision 2 Decision 3 Decision 4
✓⇤P > ✓
⇤
T ✓P = ✓
⇤
T ✓
⇤
P > ✓
⇤
T ✓P = ✓
⇤
T
K⇤P < K
⇤
T K
⇤
P < K
⇤
T KP = K
⇤
T KP = K
⇤
T
Table 2: Overview of possible decisions for the PC given a ✓⇤T and a K
⇤
T
determines which of the decisions the PC will choose, i.e., it can manipulate the investment
decision of the PC. Consequently, the TSO will never choose a timing and capacity that
will make it optimal for the PC to choose decision 1 or 2 where the TSO ends up having
overinvested. To install additional capacity, K⇤T > K
⇤
P , will be reasonable only if the TSO
has other ways of utilising the extra capacity, which we assume not to be the case. Thus, it
holds that upon investment KP and KT will be equal and determined by the lower of the
two optimal capacities.
Since the PC’s investment decision does not depend on the TSO’s decision in a direct
way, only through constraints, we choose to solve the problem in two steps. First, we present
the analytical solution to each agent’s investment problem when solved without taking into
account the constraints on capacity. We only consider timing. The reason for including
timing, and not capacity, is that the investment problem of the TSO, given in Equation
(4), depends directly on the investment timing of the PC, ✓P . Therefore, we can take into
account the optimal timing of the PC when solving for the optimal investment strategy of
the TSO. Second, we compare the two agents’ initial optimal capacities to decide which
agent has the power to decide capacity. This decision is based on which one of them has
the lower optimal capacity, i.e., the dominating capacity. Next, we update the other agent’s
investment trigger given that it has to invest in a lower capacity than it initially found
optimal. Either it holds that the PC will delay investment beyond the TSO, or it is optimal
for the PC to invest as soon as the TSO has invested. The possible outcomes of the game
are summarised in Table 3. In outcomes 1 and 2, the TSO’s optimal capacity choice is
dominating, whereas in outcomes 3 and 4, the PC has the power to decide capacity.
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TSO decides capacity PC decides capacity
Outcome 1 Outcome 2 Outcome 3 Outcome 4
✓⇤P > ✓
⇤
T ✓P = ✓
⇤
T ✓
⇤
P > ✓
⇤
T ✓P = ✓
⇤
T
KP = K⇤T KP = K
⇤
T KT = K
⇤
P KT = K
⇤
P
Table 3: Overview of possible outcomes taking all constraints into account
5 Optimal Investment Strategies
In this section, we derive the optimal solution to the investment problems of the TSO
and the PC, respectively. As described in Section 4, we start by presenting the analytical
solutions of the two investment problems disregarding the capacity constraints. Then, we
compare the two optimal capacities to decide which one will be dominating to find the
optimal investment strategies of the two agents.
5.1 Optimal investment strategies disregarding capacity constraints
5.1.1 PC’s investment decision
When we do not take into account constraints on capacity, the PC’s investment problem at
time zero is as follows:
sup
⌧P ⌧T

max
KP
E
 Z 1
s=⌧T
e ⇢s⇡(✓s, K0)ds+
Z 1
s=⌧P
e ⇢s[⇡(✓s, K0+KP ) ⇡(✓s, K0)]ds e ⇢⌧P  KP
   ✓0  .
(10)
First, we derive the now-or-never optimal capacity expansion for the PC, denoted by K⇤P ,
for a fixed t, i.e. the capacity that maximises the additional present value of the PC at time
t:
max
KP
E
 Z 1
s=t
e ⇢s[⇡(✓s, K0 +KP )  ⇡(✓s, K0)]ds  e ⇢⌧P  KP
   ✓t , (11)
which is equal to:
max
KP
 Z 1
s=t
e ⇢sE[⇡(✓s, K0 +KP )  ⇡(✓s, K0)
  ✓t]ds   KP 
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= max
KP
 Z 1
s=t
e ⇢s✓te↵s[(1  ⌘(K0 +KP ))(K0 +KP )  (1  ⌘K0)K0]ds   KP
 
= max
KP

✓t[1  ⌘(K0 +KP )](K0 +KP )
(⇢  ↵)  
✓t(1  ⌘K0)K0
(⇢  ↵)    KP
 
.
We find the derivative of the expression with respect to KP and set it equal to zero. There-
with, the optimal capacity, Kˆ⇤P , is given by:
Kˆ⇤P (✓t) =
1
2⌘

1   (⇢  ↵)
✓t
 
 K0. (12)
As the PC cannot decrease the total capacity level since we do not account for disinvestment,
K⇤P is restricted by the lower bound zero and, therefore, equal to:
K⇤P (✓t) = max
✓
1
2⌘

1   (⇢  ↵)
✓t
 
 K0, 0
◆
. (13)
After having solved for K⇤P (✓t), the PC’s investment problem at time zero reduces to:
sup
⌧P ⌧T
E
 Z 1
s=⌧T
e ⇢s⇡(✓s, K0)ds+
Z 1
s=⌧P
e ⇢s[⇡(✓s, K0 +K⇤P )  ⇡(✓s, K0)]ds  e ⇢⌧P  K⇤P
   ✓0 ,
(14)
where ⌧P is the time at which the investment in additional generation capacity is undertaken.
Next, we solve the outer optimisation problem following a dynamic programming approach
inspired by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). The solution to the optimal stopping problem is
defined by a threshold, ✓⇤P . For ✓t levels greater than ✓
⇤
P , we are in the stopping region where
it is optimal for the PC to invest immediately. For ✓t < ✓⇤P , we are in the continuation region
where demand is too low to undertake the investment, and it is optimal to wait for the PC.
The PC invests at the moment ✓t hits the optimal investment level, ✓⇤P , the first time. Thus,
the optimal investment time, ⌧ ⇤P , is equal to the first time the stochastic variable ✓t hits the
optimal level; ⌧ ⇤P ⌘ min{t : ✓t   ✓⇤P}.
Given that the TSO has already invested in a transmission line, the value of the PC can
be described by:
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F (✓t, K
⇤
P (✓t)) =
8<: A1✓ 1t + V1(✓t, K0) if ✓T  ✓t  ✓P ,V2(✓t, K0 +K⇤P (✓t)) if ✓P  ✓t, (15)
where  1 > 1 is the positive root of
1
2 
2 (    1) + ↵    ⇢ = 0. The endogenous constant,
A1, and the investment threshold, ✓⇤P , are obtained by employing the boundary condition
stated below as well as the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions between the two
branches of the value function stated in Equation (15). The value in the continuation region
is derived by finding the solution to the ordinary di↵erential equation (ODE) that stews
from the Bellman equation:
⇢Fdt = E[dF ] + ⇡(✓t, K0)dt. (16)
After expanding the equation applying Itoˆ’s Lemma, we get the following ODE:
1
2
 2✓2t
d2F
d✓2t
+ ↵✓t
dF
d✓t
  ⇢F + ⇡(✓t, K0) = 0. (17)
We guess a solution to the ODE of the following form:
F (✓t) = A1✓
 1
t + A2✓
 2
t + V1(✓t, K0). (18)
The boundary condition says that the value of the option to invest goes to zero if ✓t goes
to zero. When ✓t goes to zero, it will stay at zero given its stochastic process, see Equation
(2). Applying the boundary condition, we get that A2 is equal to zero:
lim
✓t!0
F (✓t) = 0! A2 = 0. (19)
Subsequently, we are left with:
F (✓t) = A1✓
 1
t + V1(✓t, K0). (20)
The first term in this expression is the value of the option to expand capacity at time t,
while the second term, V1(✓t, K0), denotes the present value at time t of generating and
selling an amount of power equal to the initial capacity of K0 forever;
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V1(✓t, K0) = E
 Z 1
s=t
e ⇢(s t)⇡(✓s, K0)ds
   ✓t  = ✓t(1  ⌘K0)K0
⇢  ↵ . (21)
The value in the stopping region is the net value of the PC at time t if it invests in additional
capacity:
V2(✓t, K0 +K
⇤
P ) = E
 Z 1
s=t
e ⇢(s t)⇡(✓s, K0 +K⇤P (✓t))ds   K⇤P (✓t)
   ✓t 
=
✓t(1  ⌘(K0 +K⇤P (✓t)))(K0 +K⇤P (✓t))
⇢  ↵    K
⇤
P (✓t). (22)
To determine the optimal investment threshold, ✓⇤P , and the value of the endogenous constant
A1, we employ the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions. The detailed derivations
are in Appendix A.1, where we state specifically the value-matching and smooth-pasting
conditions. They give the value of the endogenous constant A1;
A1 =
K⇤P (✓
⇤
P )(1  ⌘(2K0 +K⇤P (✓⇤P )))
⇢  ↵
1
 1
✓ˆ⇤1  1P , (23)
and the optimal investment threshold ✓ˆ⇤P , which is given by the solution to the following
implicit equation:
✓ˆ⇤P =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 
1  ⌘(2K0 +K⇤P (✓ˆ⇤P ))
. (24)
Taking the timing constraint into account, we get the optimal investment timing of the PC
given that the TSO invests at ✓T :
✓⇤P =
8<: ✓ˆ⇤P if ✓T < ✓ˆ⇤P ,✓T if ✓T   ✓ˆ⇤P . (25)
In the case whereK⇤P is equal to zero, generation capacity will never be added, i.e., ✓
⇤
P (0)=1.
The optimal investment decision of the PC is summarised in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 The optimal investment decision of the PC, without taking into account ca-
pacity restrictions caused by the TSO’s investment strategy, is to expand generation capacity
by K⇤P equal to:
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K⇤P (✓
⇤
P ) = max
✓
1
2⌘

1   (⇢  ↵)
✓⇤P
 
 K0, 0
◆
, (26)
at the moment in time when ✓t first hits ✓⇤P , equal to:
✓⇤P =
8<: ✓ˆ⇤P if ✓⇤T < ✓ˆ⇤P ,✓T if ✓⇤T   ✓ˆ⇤P , (27)
where ✓ˆ⇤P is given by the solution to the following implicit equation:
✓ˆ⇤P =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 
1  ⌘(2K0 +K⇤P (✓ˆ⇤P ))
, (28)
and ✓T for the PC is exogenously given by the TSO. In the case where K⇤P is equal to zero,
generation capacity will never be added, i.e., ✓⇤P (0)=1.
5.1.2 TSO’s investment strategy
Next, we derive analytical expressions for the optimal investment trigger and capacity of the
TSO. As discussed in Section 3, we assume that the PC will expand its generation capacity
by KP = K⇤T when solving the TSO’s investment problem.
The TSO’s investment problem at time zero is equal to:
sup
⌧T
"
max
KT
E
 Z 1
s=⌧T
e ⇢sts(✓s, K0)ds  e ⇢⌧T  (K0 +KT )+Z 1
s=⌧P
e ⇢s[ts(✓s, K0 +KT )  ts(✓s, K0)]ds  e ⇢⌧P  KT
   ✓0 #, (29)
where ts(.) denotes the continuous part of total surplus, see Equation (8).
By introducing the stochastic discount factor9, the investment problem can also be writ-
9
✓
✓0
✓T
◆ 1
is the stochastic discount factor from ✓T to ✓0. It holds that:
E
h
e ⇢⌧T
i
=
✓
✓0
✓T
◆ 1
, (30)
where ⌧T is the expected first passage time of reaching ✓T . This expression for the stochastic discount factor
is derived in, e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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ten as10:
max
✓T
"
max
KT
E
✓
✓0
✓T
◆ 1
TS(✓T , ✓P (KT ), KT )
   ✓0 #, (31)
where TS(.) is equal to the present value of the sum of total consumer surplus and producer
surplus at time ⌧T ; TS(✓T , ✓P (KT ), KT ) = CS(✓T , ✓P (KT ), KT ) + PS(✓T , ✓P (KT ), KT ).
First, we derive the total expected consumer surplus (CS) at time t:
E
 Z 1
s=t
e ⇢(s t)cs(✓s, K0)ds+
Z 1
s=⌧P
e ⇢(s t)[cs(✓s, K0 +KT )  cs(✓s, K0)]ds
   ✓t  (32)
= E
 Z 1
s=t
e ⇢(s t)
1
2
✓se
↵sK20⌘ds+
Z 1
s=⌧P
e ⇢(s t)[
1
2
✓se
↵s(K0+KT )
2⌘ 1
2
✓se
↵sK20⌘]ds
   ✓t  (33)
=
1
2
⌘K20
⇢  ↵✓t +
1
2
⌘[(K0 +KT )2  K20 ]
⇢  ↵ ✓P (KT )E
h
e ⇢(⌧P t)
i
, (34)
where ✓P (KT ) = ✓⌧P (KT ). Note that ⌧P is a decision variable of the PC and depends on the
size of the PC’s capacity expansion. Substituting for the stochastic discount factor we get
that the total expected consumer surplus, which we will denote by CS(., ., .) in the following,
is equal to:
CS(✓t, ✓P (KT ), KT ) =
1
2
⌘K20
⇢  ↵✓t +
1
2
⌘[(K0 +KT )2  K20 ]
⇢  ↵ ✓P (KT )
✓
✓t
✓P (KT )
◆ 1
. (35)
As discussed beforehand, we assume that the total expected producer surplus (PS) is equal
to the present value of the PC’s future income minus the PC’s and the TSO’s investment
cost. The total expected producer surplus at time t is given by:
E
 Z 1
s=t
e ⇢(s t)ps(✓s, K0)ds   (K0 +KT )
+
Z 1
s=⌧P
e ⇢(s t)[ps(✓s, K0 +KT )  ps(✓s, K0)]ds  e ⇢⌧P  KT
   ✓t . (36)
where ps(.) is the continuous part of the producer surplus, i.e., the profit flow of the PC.
Therefore, the total expected producer surplus, which we will denote by PS(., ., .) in the
10From solving the PC’s investment problem we know that its investment trigger depends on the capacity
it has to install, therefore we write ✓P (KT )
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following, at time t is equal to:
PS(✓t, ✓P (KT ), KT ) =
(1  ⌘K0)K0
⇢  ↵ ✓t    (K0 +KT )
+
(1  ⌘(K0 +KT ))(K0 +KT )  (1  ⌘K0)K0
⇢  ↵ ✓P (KT )
✓
✓t
✓P (KT )
◆ 1
   KT
✓
✓t
✓P (KT )
◆ 1
.
(37)
Taking the sum of the expressions for the total consumer surplus (CS) and the producer
surplus (PS), we find the total expected surplus or social welfare at time t:
TS(✓t, ✓P (KT ), KT ) =

1
2
⌘K20 + (1  ⌘K0)K0
 
✓t
⇢  ↵    (K0 +KT )
+

1
2
⌘[(K0+KT )
2 K20 ]+(1 ⌘(K0+KT ))(K0+KT )  (1 ⌘K0)K0
 
✓P (KT )
⇢  ↵
✓
✓t
✓P (KT )
◆ 1
   KT
✓
✓t
✓P (KT )
◆ 1
. (38)
The first two terms on the right-hand side of Equation (38) can be interpreted as the total
surplus given that the PC does not expand its generation capacity, while the last two terms
can be interpreted as the additional total surplus if the PC increases its capacity byKP = KT
at time ⌧P . From this expression, we obtain insight into the benefits and costs for the TSO
of investing before the PC expands its generation capacity. First, if the existing capacity of
the power plant K0 is low, then the TSO achieves little social welfare from investing before
the PC expands. Second, low levels of demand, ✓t, gives little benefit from investing before
the PC. Third, if the TSO’s marginal investment cost is high, then a higher demand level
and K0 is needed for the investment to be undertaken before the PC. On the other hand, if
  is close to zero, then the TSO will invest immediately as long as the price is positive.
If ✓P increases, then the total surplus less the investment cost is higher at time ⌧P .
However, when the PC delays investment, the present value of the net additional surplus
also diminishes as it is discounted more.
After finding the expression for the total surplus, the TSO’s investment problem at time
zero can be rewritten. Note that we from now on consider the PC’s optimal investment
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timing, ✓⇤P (KT ). Then the investment problem is equal to:
max
✓T
"
max
KT
✓
✓0
✓T
◆ 1"1
2
⌘K20 + (1  ⌘K0)K0
 
✓T
⇢  ↵    (K0 +KT )
+

1
2
⌘[(K0+KT )
2 K20 ]+(1 ⌘(K0+KT ))(K0+KT )  (1 ⌘K0)K0
 
✓⇤P (KT )
⇢  ↵
✓
✓T
✓⇤P (KT )
◆ 1
   KT
✓
✓T
✓⇤P (KT )
◆ 1##
. (39)
We continue by solving the inner investment problem and maximise the expression for
the total surplus with respect to KT to find the now-or-never optimal K⇤T for a given time
t. When doing this, we need to anticipate the PC’s investment timing response if it has to
invest in a generation capacity of size K⇤T . We take into account that the PC maximises
profit and that its optimal investment time depends on the size of its capacity expansion.
As the optimal timing of investment for the PC, see Equation (28), is increasing in capacity;
@✓⇤P (KT )
@KT
=
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 ⌘K2T
[(1  ⌘(K0 +KT ))(K0 +KT )  (1  ⌘K0)K0]2 > 0, (40)
the larger capacity the TSO forces the PC to invest in, the longer it will wait with under-
taking the capacity expansion. In other words, the TSO will have to consider the trade-o↵
between a large capacity and the PC delaying investment.
Next, we solve the inner extremum by finding the derivative of Equation (38) with respect
to KT and setting it equal to zero. Note that before finding the derivative, we substitute
for ✓⇤P (KT ) into Equation (38). Then, we get the following implicit equation for Kˆ
⇤
T :
  +

  [2⌘Kˆ⇤T (⌘K0(    2)    + 1) + (2⌘K0   1)(2⌘K0(    2)    + 1])
2(    1)(⌘Kˆ⇤T + 2⌘K0   1)2
+
 
    1 
  
2
 
⇤
(    1)✓t(⌘Kˆ⇤T + 2⌘K0   1)
  (↵  ⇢)
 
= 0. (41)
As we require the TSO to at least be able to distribute an amount of power equal to the
current capacity of the PC, K0, the optimal K⇤T is equal to:
K⇤T (✓t) = max
 
Kˆ⇤T (✓t), 0
 
. (42)
After having solved for K⇤T , the outer extremum of the TSO’s investment problem is equal
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to:
max
✓T
✓
✓0
✓T
◆ 1"1
2
⌘K20 + (1  ⌘K0)K0
 
✓T
⇢  ↵    (K0 +K
⇤
T (✓T ))
+

1
2
⌘[(K0 +K
⇤
T (✓T ))
2  K20 ] + (1  ⌘(K0 +K⇤T (✓T )))(K0 +K⇤T (✓T ))  (1  ⌘K0)K0
 
⇤
✓⇤P (K
⇤
T (✓T ))
⇢  ↵
✓
✓T
✓⇤P (K
⇤
T (✓T ))
◆ 1
   K⇤T (✓T )
✓
✓T
✓⇤P (K
⇤
T (✓T ))
◆ 1#
. (43)
We proceed by following a dynamic programming approach to solve the optimal stopping
problem and find ✓⇤T . The value for the TSO, F , at time t is equal to:
F (✓t, K
⇤
T (✓t), ✓
⇤
P (K
⇤
T (✓t))) =
8<: B1✓ 1t if ✓t  ✓T ,TS(✓t, K⇤T (✓t), ✓⇤P (K⇤T (✓t))) if ✓T  ✓t. (44)
The value in the continuation region is equal the value of the option to invest in the trans-
mission line, while the value in the stopping region is equal to the value of the total surplus
given that investment has occurred. The value in the continuation region is derived by find-
ing the solution to the ordinary di↵erential equation (ODE) that stews from the Bellman
equation:
⇢Fdt = E[dF ]. (45)
After expanding the equation applying Itoˆ’s Lemma, we get the following ODE:
1
2
 2✓2t
d2F
d✓2t
+ ↵✓t
dF
d✓t
  ⇢F = 0. (46)
We guess a solution of the following form:
F (✓t) = B1✓
 1
t +B2✓
 2
t , (47)
and apply the boundary condition to find that B2 is equal to zero:
lim
✓t!0
F (✓t) = 0! B2 = 0. (48)
Given that the PC invests after the TSO, the net value of the total surplus at time t is given
by Equation (38).
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To determine the optimal investment threshold, ✓⇤T , and the value of the endogenous
constant B1, we employ the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions. The detailed
derivations are in Appendix A.2, where we state specifically the value-matching and smooth-
pasting conditions. We find that:
B1 =

K0   1
2
⌘K20
 
✓⇤1  1T
 1(⇢  ↵) +

K⇤T (✓
⇤
T )(1  ⌘(K0  
1
2
K⇤T (✓
⇤
T )))
 
✓⇤P (K
⇤
T )
⇤1  1
⇢  ↵
   K⇤T (✓⇤T )✓⇤P (K⇤T )⇤  1 , (49)
and that the optimal investment threshold of the TSO is given by the solution to the
following implicit equation:
✓⇤T =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 (K0 +K⇤T (✓
⇤
T ))
K0(1  12⌘K0)
. (50)
After finding the optimal investment strategy of the TSO, the optimal investment trigger
of the PC, ✓⇤P (K
⇤
T ), is equal to Equation (28) but with K
⇤
T instead of K
⇤
P :
✓⇤P (K
⇤
T ) =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 K⇤T
1  ⌘(2K0 +K⇤T )
. (51)
In the case whereK⇤T is equal to zero, generation capacity will never be added, i.e., ✓
⇤
P (0)=1.
When finding K⇤T , the TSO takes into account the optimal investment threshold of the
PC given that it has to invest in K⇤T . ✓
⇤
P (K
⇤
T ) needs to be larger than ✓
⇤
T (K
⇤
T ) for the analyt-
ical solutions above to be valid. If this is not the case, then we assume the corner solution
✓P = ✓⇤T to be optimal, see Figure 2. However, then we need to derive the TSO’s optimal
investment problem given that it decides capacity and timing for both.
Corner solution: ✓P = ✓⇤T
In this case, the PC does not hold an option to decide either capacity or timing and will
have to follow the TSO’s investment strategy. Therefore, we need to solve only the TSO’s
investment problem, given that they both invest at the same time, which at time zero is
equal to::
sup
⌧T
"
max
KT
E
 Z 1
s=⌧T
e ⇢sts(✓s, K0 +KT )ds  e ⇢⌧T  (K0 +KT )  e ⇢⌧T  (KT )
   ✓0 #. (52)
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The total expected surplus at time t is given by:
TS(✓t, KT ) =

1
2
⌘(K0+KT )
2+(1 ⌘(K0+KT ))(K0+KT )
 
✓t
⇢  ↵  (K0+KT )  KT . (53)
Taking the derivative of Equation (53) with respect to KT and setting it equal to zero, we
find the now-or-never optimal capacity, K⇤T , given that we do not allow for disinvestment:
K⇤T (✓t) = max
✓
1
⌘

1  (  +  )(⇢  ↵)
✓t
 
 K0, 0
◆
. (54)
We proceed by following a dynamic programming approach to solve the optimal stopping
problem. The value for the TSO, F , at time t is equal to:
F (✓t, K
⇤
T (✓t)) =
8<: B1✓ 1t if ✓t  ✓T ,TS(✓t, K⇤T (✓t)) if ✓T  ✓t, (55)
where the value in the continuation region is derived by finding the solution to the ordinary
di↵erential equation (ODE) that stews from the Bellman equation:
⇢Fdt = E[dF ]. (56)
Standard calculations similar to those in the two preceding cases are performed, which lead
to the value function stated in Equation (55).
To determine the optimal investment threshold, ✓⇤T , and the value of the endogenous
constant B1, we employ the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions. The detailed
derivations are in Appendix A.3, where we specifically state the value-matching and smooth-
pasting conditions. We find that:
B1 =

(K0 +K
⇤
T (✓
⇤
T ))(1 
1
2
⌘(K0 +K
⇤
T (✓
⇤
T )))
 
✓⇤1  1T
 1(⇢  ↵) , (57)
and ✓⇤T is given by the solution to the following implicit equation:
✓⇤T =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 (K0 +K⇤T (✓
⇤
T )) +  K
⇤
T (✓
⇤
T )
(K0 +K⇤T (✓
⇤
T ))(1  12⌘(K0 +K⇤T (✓⇤T )))
. (58)
The optimal investment strategy of the TSO is summarised in the following Proposition:
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Proposition 2 The optimal investment strategy of the TSO, assuming that the PC has to
expand capacity by KP = K⇤T , is to invest in a transmission capacity of K0 + K
⇤
T . K
⇤
T is
equal to:
K⇤T (✓
⇤
T ) = max
 
Kˆ⇤T (✓
⇤
T ), 0
 
, (59)
where Kˆ⇤T (✓
⇤
T ) is given by the following implicit equation:
  +

  [2⌘Kˆ⇤T (⌘K0(    2)    + 1) + (2⌘K0   1)(2⌘K0(    2)    + 1])
2(    1)(⌘Kˆ⇤T + 2⌘K0   1)2
+
 
    1 
  
2
 
⇤
(    1)✓⇤T (⌘Kˆ⇤T + 2⌘K0   1)
  (↵  ⇢)
 
= 0. (60)
The optimal investment time is the moment in time when ✓t reaches ✓⇤T , which is given by
the solution to the following implicit equation:
✓⇤T =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 (K0 +K⇤T (✓
⇤
T ))
K0(1  12⌘K0)
. (61)
The PC would then expand capacity when ✓t reaches ✓⇤P (K
⇤
T ) given that it had no flexibility
to choose the size of its investment:
✓⇤P (K
⇤
T ) =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 K⇤T
1  ⌘(2K0 +K⇤T )
. (62)
In the case where K⇤T is equal to zero, generation capacity will never be added, i.e., ✓
⇤
P (0)=1.
However, if this solution is not valid, i.e., ✓⇤P (K
⇤
T ) < ✓
⇤
T (K
⇤
T ), then we assume the corner
solution ✓P = ✓⇤T to be optimal. The optimal investment strategy of the TSO, given that both
agents invest at the same time, is to invest in a capacity of:
K⇤T (✓
⇤
T ) = max
✓
1
⌘

1  (  +  )(⇢  ↵)
✓⇤T
 
 K0, 0
◆
, (63)
at the moment in time when ✓t hits ✓⇤T , which is given by the solution to the following implicit
equation:
✓⇤T =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 (K0 +K⇤T (✓
⇤
T )) +  K
⇤
T (✓
⇤
T )
(K0 +K⇤T (✓
⇤
T ))(1  12⌘(K0 +K⇤T (✓⇤T )))
. (64)
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5.2 Optimal investment strategies when considering constraints
on capacities
We continue by taking into account the capacity constraints. First, we present optimal
strategies for both agents if the TSO’s capacity is dominating, i.e., K⇤T  K⇤P , and continue
with the outcomes where the PC’s optimal capacity is dominating, i.e., K⇤P < K
⇤
T , see Table
3. We also compare the total value for the PC and the TSO corresponding to each possible
outcome. We take into account that we cannot compare the two agents’ values at their
investment thresholds, because we would compare situations at di↵erent moments in time
as their investment thresholds can be di↵erent. Therefore, we compare all values at the
current level, ✓0, considered su ciently small so that the optimal investment triggers will
be larger than ✓0.
5.2.1 Optimal investment strategies when the capacity of the TSO is dominat-
ing
If K⇤T  K⇤P is the solution to the investment problems in Section 5.1, then the TSO’s
capacity, K⇤T , will be the dominating capacity. The TSO will invest in K
⇤
T at ✓
⇤
T , and it can
therewith force the PC to invest in a smaller capacity than it found optimal, i.e., KP = K⇤T .
Therefore, we find a new optimal trigger ✓⇤P for the PC. In the case where ✓
⇤
P (K
⇤
T ) > ✓
⇤
T (K
⇤
T ),
this is the same ✓⇤P (K
⇤
T ) as the TSO expected for the PC in Section 5.1.2. However when
we get that ✓⇤P (K
⇤
T ) < ✓
⇤
T (K
⇤
T ), we assume the corner solution ✓P = ✓
⇤
T to be optimal, i.e., it
is optimal for the PC to invest as soon as the TSO has invested. Note that the two possible
outcomes when K⇤T is the dominating capacity corresponds to outcomes 1 and 2 in Table 3.
We get the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 The optimal investment strategies of the two agents, given that the TSO’s
capacity is dominating, are given in Table 4. Two possible outcomes might occur. Either
they invest at the same time or the PC delays investment beyond the investment time of the
TSO.
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Optimal investment strategies given that the TSO’s optimal capacity is dominating
K⇤T  K⇤P
KP = K⇤T
O
u
tc
om
e
1
✓⇤P > ✓
⇤
T
TSO’s optimal strategy:
K⇤T = max
 
Kˆ⇤T (✓
⇤
T ), 0
 
, where Kˆ⇤T (✓
⇤
T ) is given by the
following implicit equation:
   +

  [2⌘Kˆ⇤T (⌘K0(  2)  +1)+(2⌘K0 1)(2⌘K0(  2)  +1])
2(  1)(⌘Kˆ⇤T+2⌘K0 1)2
+    1     2
 
⇤

(  1)✓⇤T (⌘Kˆ⇤T+2⌘K0 1)
  (↵ ⇢)
 
= 0
✓⇤T =
 1
 1 1(⇢  ↵)
 (K0+K⇤T (✓
⇤
T ))
K0(1  12⌘K0)
PC’s optimal decision:
KP = K⇤T
✓⇤P =
 1
 1 1(⇢  ↵)  1 ⌘(2K0+K⇤T )
O
u
tc
om
e
2
✓P = ✓⇤T
TSO’s optimal strategy:
K⇤T = max
✓
1
⌘

1  ( + )(⇢ ↵)✓⇤T
 
 K0, 0
◆
✓⇤T =
 1
 1 1(⇢  ↵)
 (K0+K⇤T (✓
⇤
T ))+ K
⇤
T (✓
⇤
T )
(K0+K⇤T (✓
⇤
T ))(1  12⌘(K0+K⇤T (✓⇤T )))
PC’s optimal decision:
KP = K⇤T
✓P = ✓⇤T
Table 4: Overview of optimal investment strategies if K⇤T  K⇤P corresponding to outcomes
1 and 2
If the PC invests after the TSO, then the resulting value at time zero for each agent is
equal to11:
VTSO(✓
⇤
T , ✓
⇤
P , K
⇤
T ) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h1
2
⌘K20 + (1  ⌘K0)K0
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵    (K0 +K
⇤
T )
+

1
2
⌘[(K0+K
⇤
T )
2 K20 ]+(1 ⌘(K0+K⇤T ))(K0+K⇤T )  (1 ⌘K0)K0
 
✓⇤P (K
⇤
T )
⇢  ↵
✓
✓⇤T
✓⇤P (K
⇤
T )
◆ 1
   K⇤T
✓
✓⇤T
✓⇤P (K
⇤
T )
◆ 1 
, (65)
11Note, in all value functions in this and the following section we have refrained from writing the capacity’s
dependency on the optimal investment trigger for readability.
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VPC(✓
⇤
T , ✓
⇤
P , K
⇤
T ) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h
(1  ⌘K0)K0
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵
+
h
(1 ⌘(K0+K⇤T ))(K0+K⇤T )  (1 ⌘K0)K0
i✓⇤P (K⇤T )
⇢  ↵
✓
✓⇤T
✓⇤P (K
⇤
T )
◆ 1
  K⇤T
✓
✓⇤T
✓⇤P (K
⇤
T )
◆ 1 
.
(66)
Note that when stating the value functions throughout this paper, the first term within
the dependency bracket corresponds to the investment threshold of the TSO. The second
corresponds to the investment threshold for the PC, while the last term corresponds to the
capacity the agents install.
If it is optimal for the PC to invest at the same time as the TSO, i.e., ✓P (K⇤T ) = ✓
⇤
T (K
⇤
T ),
then the value functions simplify to:
VTSO(✓
⇤
T , ✓
⇤
T , K
⇤
T ) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h1
2
⌘(K0 +K
⇤
T )
2 + (1  ⌘(K0 +K⇤T ))(K0 +K⇤T )
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵
   (K0 +K⇤T )   K⇤T
 
, (67)
VPC(✓
⇤
T , ✓
⇤
T , K
⇤
T ) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h
(1  ⌘(K0 +K⇤T ))(K0 +K⇤T )
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵    KT
 
. (68)
In the case whereK⇤T is equal to zero, generation capacity will never be added, i.e., ✓
⇤
P (0)=1.
The value for the TSO and the PC are equal to:
VTSO(✓
⇤
T ,1, 0) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h1
2
⌘K20 + (1  ⌘K0)K0
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵    K0
 
, (69)
and:
VPC(✓
⇤
T ,1, 0) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h
(1  ⌘K0)K0
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵
 
, (70)
respectively.
5.2.2 Optimal investment strategies when the capacity of the PC is dominating
On the other hand, if K⇤P < K
⇤
T is the solution to the investment problems in Section 5.1,
K⇤P will be the dominating capacity. The TSO will invest in K
⇤
P and find a new optimal
investment trigger ✓⇤T based on K
⇤
P , which is equal to:
✓⇤T (K
⇤
P (✓
⇤
P )) =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 (K0 +K⇤P (✓
⇤
P ))
K0(1  12⌘K0)
. (71)
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If ✓⇤T (K
⇤
P ) is lower than ✓
⇤
P (K
⇤
P ), then this will be the optimal investment strategy.
On the contrary, if ✓⇤P (K
⇤
P ) < ✓
⇤
T (K
⇤
P ), then we assume the corner solution ✓P = ✓
⇤
T to
be optimal. Subsequently, the TSO will have the power to decide timing and the PC the
power to decide capacity. In this case, we need to solve the PC’s investment problem given
that it only has sizing flexibility and the TSO’s optimal stopping problem given that both
agents invest at the same time in K⇤P . The investment problem of the PC at time zero is
then equal to:
max
KP
E
 Z 1
s=⌧T
e ⇢s⇡(✓s, K0 +KP )ds  e ⇢⌧P  KP
   ✓0 , (72)
while the investment problem of the TSO at time zero is equal to:
sup
⌧T
E
 Z 1
s=⌧T
e ⇢sts(✓s, K0 +KP )ds  e ⇢⌧T  (K0 +KP )  e ⇢⌧T  KP
   ✓0 . (73)
See Appendix B.3 for the derivation of the solution to these investment problems. The
optimal investment strategy of the TSO given that they both invest at the same time, is to
invest in a capacity of KT = K⇤P , where K
⇤
P is equal to:
K⇤P (✓
⇤
T ) = max
✓
1
2⌘

1   (⇢  ↵)
✓⇤T
 
 K0, 0
◆
. (74)
Furthermore, the optimal investment threshold of the TSO, ✓⇤T , is given by the solution to
the following implicit equation:
 1   1
 1
(K0 +K⇤P (✓
⇤
T )(1  12⌘(K0 +K⇤P (✓⇤T )))
⇢  ↵ ✓
⇤2
T
 

 (K0 +K
⇤
P (✓
⇤
T )) +  K
⇤
P (✓
⇤
T ) +
 (1  ⌘(K0 +K⇤P (✓⇤T ))
2⌘ 1
 
✓⇤T +
 (  +  )(⇢  ↵)
2⌘ 1
= 0. (75)
We get the following Proposition:
Proposition 4 The optimal investment strategies of the two agents, given that the PC’s
capacity is dominating, are given in Table 5. Two possible outcomes might occur. Either
they invest at the same time or the PC delays investment beyond the investment time of the
TSO.
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Optimal investment strategies given that the PC’s optimal capacity is dominating
K⇤P < K
⇤
T
KT = K⇤P
O
u
tc
om
e
3
✓⇤P > ✓
⇤
T
TSO’s optimal strategy:
KT = K⇤P
✓⇤T =
 1
 1 1(⇢  ↵)
 (K0+K⇤P (✓
⇤
P ))
K0(1  12⌘K0)
PC’s optimal decision:
K⇤P = max
✓
1
2⌘

1   (⇢ ↵)✓⇤P
 
 K0, 0
◆
✓⇤P =
 1
 1 1(⇢  ↵)  1 ⌘(2K0+K⇤P (✓⇤P ))
O
u
tc
om
e
4
✓P = ✓⇤T
TSO’s optimal strategy:
KT = K⇤P
✓⇤T is given by the following implicit equation:
 1 1
 1
(K0+K⇤P (✓
⇤
T )(1  12⌘(K0+K⇤P (✓⇤T )))
⇢ ↵ ✓
⇤2
T
 

 (K0 +K⇤P (✓
⇤
T )) +  K
⇤
P (✓
⇤
T ) +
 (1 ⌘(K0+K⇤P (✓⇤T ))
2⌘ 1
 
✓⇤T
+  ( + )(⇢ ↵)2⌘ 1 = 0
PC’s optimal decision:
K⇤P = max
✓
1
2⌘

1   (⇢ ↵)✓⇤T
 
 K0, 0
◆
✓P = ✓⇤T
Table 5: Overview of optimal investment strategies if K⇤P < K
⇤
T corresponding to outcomes
3 and 4
Note that the two possible outcomes when K⇤P is the dominating capacity corresponds to
outcomes 3 and 4 in Table 3.
If the PC invests after the TSO, then the resulting value at time zero for each agent is
equal to:
VTSO(✓
⇤
T , ✓
⇤
P , K
⇤
P ) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h1
2
⌘K20 + (1  ⌘K0)K0
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵    (K0 +K
⇤
P )
+

1
2
⌘[(K0+K
⇤
P )
2 K20 ]+(1 ⌘(K0+K⇤P ))(K0+K⇤P )  (1 ⌘K0)K0
 
✓⇤P (K
⇤
P )
⇢  ↵
✓
✓⇤T
✓⇤P (K
⇤
P )
◆ 1
   K⇤P
✓
✓⇤T
✓⇤P (K
⇤
P )
◆ 1 
, (76)
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VPC(✓
⇤
T , ✓
⇤
P , K
⇤
P ) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h
(1  ⌘K0)K0
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵
+
h
(1 ⌘(K0+K⇤P ))(K0+K⇤P ) (1 ⌘K0)K0
i✓⇤P (K⇤P )
⇢  ↵
✓
✓⇤T
✓⇤P (K
⇤
P )
◆ 1
  K⇤P
✓
✓⇤T
✓⇤P (K
⇤
P )
◆ 1 
.
(77)
If it is optimal for the PC to invest at the same time as the TSO, i.e., ✓P (K⇤P ) = ✓
⇤
T (K
⇤
P ),
then the value functions simplify to:
VTSO(✓
⇤
T , ✓
⇤
T , K
⇤
P ) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h1
2
⌘(K0 +K
⇤
P )
2 + (1  ⌘(K0 +K⇤P ))(K0 +K⇤P )
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵
   (K0 +K⇤P )   K⇤P
 
, (78)
VPC(✓
⇤
T , ✓
⇤
T , K
⇤
P ) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h
(1  ⌘(K0 +K⇤P ))(K0 +K⇤P )
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵    KP
 
. (79)
In the case where K⇤P is equal to zero and generation capacity will never be added, i.e.,
✓⇤P (0)=1. The value for the TSO and the PC are equal to:
VTSO(✓
⇤
T ,1, 0) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h1
2
⌘K20 + (1  ⌘K0)K0
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵    K0
 
, (80)
and:
VPC(✓
⇤
T ,1, 0) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h
(1  ⌘K0)K0
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵
 
, (81)
respectively.
6 Results
In this section, we will present a numerical analysis in order to illustrate the analytical
results and to gain additional insights12. The following parameter values are used as a
base case: ⇢ = 0.03, ↵ = 0.015, ⌘ = 0.01,   = 0.15, K0 = 100,   = 100, and   = 40. The
marginal investment cost of the TSO is chosen to be lower than that of the PC as for example
Baringo and Conejo (2012) argue that the marginal investment cost of transmission facilities
12All numerical results are obtained using the software program MATLAB R2014a.
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is comparatively much lower than the marginal investment cost of wind power plants13. In
the end of the analysis, we will vary  , the marginal investment cost of the PC, to analyse
how the decision of the PC is a↵ected by its marginal investment cost.
When building renewable power plants in remote areas, often a small plant is already
installed while it has to undergo a large expansion to be connected to the main grid. For
this reason, K0 is chosen to be relatively low compared to the values of K⇤T and K
⇤
P . When
comparing value functions, the value of each agent at investment has to be discounted back
to the current demand level14, which is set equal to ✓0 = 1.
We start by presenting economic results from the sub-problems before we proceed with
numerical analysis of the full model. We are not studying a specific case example, therefore
the model parameters are not calibrated on a real data set. The goal is to provide more
general economic insight into the optimal investment decision of a TSO. Throughout the
analysis, the focus is on providing insights with respect to 1) how much welfare a TSO will
forgo by disregarding the PC’s optimal investment decision, 2) the e↵ect of uncertainty on
optimal transmission and generation investment strategies, and 3) the value of managerial
flexibility. In addition, we perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to the PC’s marginal
investment cost,  , in order to gain insight into how a subsidy of the PC’s investment cost
can a↵ect its optimal capacity choice, K⇤P , as well as its optimal investment threshold, ✓
⇤
P ,
and hence social welfare.
6.1 Welfare loss from not having power to decide the PC’s capac-
ity
In Norway, we see that the TSO, Statnett, tries to influence PCs’ capacity choice by setting
a minimum capacity that the PCs have commit to install for the TSO to build specific
transmission lines15. The motivation behind the following analysis is to reveal how much
13The marginal investment cost of the TSO depends on several factors like the voltage, thickness and
length of the power lines, while the marginal investment cost of the PC, among other things, depends on
the type of power plant. Therefore the di↵erence between the two marginal investment costs will vary from
project to project. However, when consulting the Norwegian TSO, Statnett, their general impression is that
marginal transmission investment costs are considerably lower than marginal generation investment costs.
14As the optimal investment timing of the two agents might di↵er, the value functions need to be dis-
counted to the same point in time in order to be comparable.
15Currently, Statnett considers building transmission lines from Trollheim to Snillfjord and Namsos to
Storheia but it requires a group of PCs to commit to install a total generation capacity of 1000 MW
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generation capacity the TSO will want the PC to commit to install, and the welfare loss
from not being able to do so. In this section, we first study the welfare loss when the agents
do not have timing flexibility, i.e., they have to make now-or-never investment decisions.
Next, we extend the analysis by providing both agents with timing flexibility.
6.1.1 Without timing flexibility
First, we investigate how the optimal capacities of a TSO and a PC di↵er due to their
di↵erent objectives when both agents face a now-or-never investment decision, i.e., sub-
problem 1. The solution to the sub-problem and the corresponding derivations can be
found in Appendix C.1.
If the PC can choose the optimal size of its generation expansion, it will be equal to:
K⇤P (✓0) = max
✓
1
2⌘

1   (⇢  ↵)
✓0
 
 K0, 0
◆
. (82)
And, if the TSO can decide its own capacity exceeding K0 and the generation capacity of
the PC, they will be equal to:
K⇤T (✓0) = KP (✓0) = max
✓
1
⌘

1  (  +  )(⇢  ↵)
✓0
 
 K0, 0
◆
. (83)
Comparing these results, we find that the TSO’s total optimal capacity is twice the total
optimal capacity of the PC minus a correction term and equal to:
K0 +K
⇤
T = 2(K0 +K
⇤
P ) 
1
⌘
 (⇢  ↵)
✓0
. (84)
The following Proposition states the condition for when the capacity of the TSO will be
larger than that of the PC if they both invest at time zero.
Proposition 5 If both agents invest immediately at time zero, then the total optimal ca-
pacity of the TSO will be larger than the total optimal capacity of the PC if the following
condition holds:
1
⌘
 (⇢  ↵)
✓0
< K0 +K
⇤
P , (85)
before it will start building. See http://www.norwea.no/nyhetsarkiv/visning-nyheter/ett-av-prosjektene-i-
snillfjord-vraket.aspx?PID=1145Action=1,http://www.tu.no/kraft/2015/03/09/nve-statnett-krav-i-strid-
med-energiloven
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which is equivalent to:
✓0
⇢  ↵ > 2  +  . (86)
In this case, the flexibility of sizing will be of no value for the TSO.
The result is similar to the result of Huisman and Kort (2014) who consider one firm that
can undertake an investment to enter a market where there is no firm active. They compare
the optimal capacity level of the firm given a social welfare and a profit objective and find
that the optimal capacity level given a welfare objective is twice the level of a monopolist.
The di↵erence of Huisman and Kort (2014) to this paper is that they compare the optimal
capacity for a single firm optimising either social welfare or profit, while we consider two
firms in the same model. We find that the optimal capacity for the TSO is twice the optimal
capacity of the PC minus a correction term. The reason is that when both agents operate in
the same market, we need to include both investment costs when calculating total surplus.
If we considered only one agent, we would get the same result as in Huisman and Kort
(2014).
If we use the base case parameters, then we get the numerical results shown in Figure
4. When the demand level, ✓0, is very low, then the size of the optimal capacity expansion
of the PC is higher than that of the TSO. The TSO will not want to invest at this demand
Figure 4: Optimal capacities as functions of
✓0 for the base case parameters in the case
of now-or-never investments.
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level, i.e., K⇤T (✓0) = 0. For higher demand levels, the TSO’s optimal capacity exceeding K0
is more than twice the optimal capacity expansion of the PC. Thus, the TSO will want the
PC to commit to install a capacity that is considerably larger than the one the PC finds
optimal.
The producer surplus is both positively and negatively a↵ected by a capacity increase.
The amount of power generated increases, but the price per unit decreases and the total
investment cost increases. On the contrary, the consumer surplus is strictly increasing in
capacity. Thus, the total surplus is growing at a higher rate than the producer surplus when
capacity is increasing. The objective of the PC only takes into account a part of the total
producer surplus, which is the continuous profit flow and the investment cost of the PC.
The objective of the TSO, on the other hand, includes the consumer surplus in addition to
the total producer surplus. Therefore, as the PC does not take into account the consumer
surplus when finding its optimal capacity, it is expected that the TSO has a larger optimal
capacity.
If the TSO has to accept the PC’s optimal capacity, the social welfare achieved will
be considerably lower than if it could make the PC to commit to install a capacity of
KP = K⇤T . The welfare loss for the TSO from not having the power to decide the size of
the PC’s capacity expansion, expressed in percentage, is equal to:
Welfare loss =
VTSO(✓0, ✓0, K⇤T )  VTSO(✓0, ✓0,min(K⇤T , K⇤P ))
VTSO(✓0, ✓0, K⇤T )
. (87)
Figure 5 illustrates that the percentage welfare loss is increasing in the demand level ✓0. This
is because the di↵erence between the two agents’ optimal capacities, K⇤T  K⇤P , is increasing.
The percentage welfare loss increases strongly for low values of ✓0 while more moderately
for higher values. For demand levels above ✓0 = 10, the welfare loss from not being able
to make the PC commit to install K⇤T is higher than 20%. The result can explain why in
practice TSOs try to force PCs to commit to install a minimum capacity before building
a transmission line. In the next section, we will extend this analysis by including timing
flexibility for both agents.
6.1.2 With timing flexibility
Here, we extend the model from Section 6.1.1 by providing both agents with timing flexibil-
ity. We compare sub-problem 2 and 3 where in sub-problem 2 the PC decides capacity for
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Figure 5: Percentage welfare loss from not
having the power to force the PC to invest
in K⇤T in the case of now-or-never invest-
ments for the base case parameters.
both agents, while in sub-problem 3 the TSO decides. Note that the derivations and optimal
investment strategies corresponding to these sub-problems can be found in Appendix C.2
and C.3.
With the parameters from the base case, we get the numerical results shown in Figure 6.
The TSO will want the PC to commit to install a capacity that is significantly larger than
the capacity the PC will want to install, i.e., K⇤T > K
⇤
P . Given that ✓
⇤
P (K) > ✓
⇤
T (K), which
is the case here, both investment thresholds are strictly increasing in K, see Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 Given that ✓⇤P (K) > ✓
⇤
T (K), the investment threshold of the PC and the
TSO, respectively, are strictly increasing in K as:
@✓⇤P (K)
@K
=
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 ⌘
(1  ⌘(2K0 +K))2 > 0, (88)
and:
@✓⇤T (K)
@K
=
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 
1
2⌘K
2
0 + (1  ⌘K0)K0
> 0. (89)
Therefore, the investment triggers ✓⇤T and ✓
⇤
P will be higher if both agents have to invest in
a capacity of size K⇤T , compared to if both have to invest in K
⇤
P . Thus, it is optimal for the
TSO to make the PC commit to install a larger capacity at a later point in time than what
is optimal for the PC.
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Figure 6: Optimal capacities (left) and optimal investment thresholds (right) for the TSO
and the PC as functions of   for the base case parameters.
Furthermore, we find that the PC will invest later than the TSO in both cases, see Figure
6. The condition for when the PC’s investment trigger will be higher than that of the TSO,
given that they have to invest in the same capacity, is given in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7 If both agents have to invest in the same capacity, then the PC will delay
investment beyond the investment threshold of the TSO as long as:
 
 
>
(K0 +K)(1  ⌘(2K0 +K))
K0(1  12⌘K0)
. (90)
If this condition is satisfied, the flexibility to choose timing, i.e., the ability to wait for
more information, is of value for the PC and it will choose to delay investment beyond the
moment in time the when the TSO invests.
Furthermore, Figure 6 shows that the optimal capacities and the investment triggers are
increasing in uncertainty. This can be shown analytically for the investment triggers and
the optimal capacity of the PC given that ✓⇤P (K) > ✓
⇤
T (K), see Proposition 8. However, the
implicit expression for K⇤T forces us to bend towards numerical analysis to show the e↵ect
of uncertainty on the TSO’s optimal investment trigger. Extensive numerical analyses lead
to the result that the TSO’s optimal capacity is also increasing in uncertainty. That both
optimal investment triggers and capacities are increasing in uncertainty is consistent with
existing real options literature. However, to our best knowledge, we are the first ones to
confirm that this also holds for a model that includes two firms with di↵erent objectives.
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Proposition 8 Given that ✓⇤P (K) > ✓
⇤
T (K) the following holds:
d✓⇤T
d 
> 0, (91)
d✓⇤P
d 
> 0, (92)
dK⇤P
d 
> 0. (93)
The percentage welfare loss if the TSO cannot make the PC commit to install a capacity
of KP = K⇤T when both agents have timing flexibility and K
⇤
P is the dominating capacity is
equal to:
Welfare loss =
VTSO(✓⇤T (K
⇤
T ), ✓
⇤
P (K
⇤
T ), K
⇤
T )  VTSO(✓⇤T (K⇤P ), ✓⇤P (K⇤P ), K⇤P )
VTSO(✓⇤T (K
⇤
T ), ✓
⇤
P (K
⇤
T ), K
⇤
T )
. (94)
The numerical result is shown in Figure 7. When uncertainty is very low, the welfare loss is
only around 2   3%. However, when uncertainty increases the loss increases to more than
10%. Therefore when uncertainty in future demand is high, it is even more important for
TSOs to make PCs commit to install a certain capacity than when uncertainty is low.
Figure 7: Percentage welfare loss from not
being able to decide the PC’s capacity as a
function of   for the base case parameters.
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6.2 Welfare loss from disregarding the PC’s flexibility to choose
capacity
Based on the large di↵erences between the two agents’ optimal capacities revealed in the last
section, the TSO will face a welfare loss if it disregards the PC’s flexibility to choose capacity,
and rather assumes that the PC will install a generation capacity equal to the capacity of
the transmission line. In this section, we study the welfare loss when both agents do not
have timing flexibility, i.e., face a now-or-never investment decision, and when both agents
have timing flexibility.
6.2.1 Without timing flexibility
The numerical results shown in Figure 4 show that if both agents invest at time zero and
the TSO disregards that the PC has flexibility to decide its own capacity, then the TSO
will overinvest by choosing to invest in K0 + K⇤T in case K
⇤
T > K
⇤
P . Then a transmission
capacity of K⇤T  K⇤P will be left unused. The TSO will pay for a transmission capacity of
K0 +K⇤T , but the rest of the producer surplus as well as the consumer surplus will depend
on the generation capacity of the PC, i.e., the amount of power that is being generated
and transmitted. Therefore, if the TSO disregards the investment decision of the PC, the
present value of the total surplus is equal to the following expression16:
VTSO(✓0, ✓0, K) =h1
2
⌘(K0 +min(K
⇤
P , K
⇤
T ))
2 + (1  ⌘(K0 +min(K⇤P , K⇤T )))(K0 +min(K⇤P , K⇤T ))
i ✓0
⇢  ↵
   (K0 +K⇤T )   min(K⇤P , K⇤T )
 
. (95)
This will yield a lower social welfare than if the TSO instead anticipated the PC’s opti-
mal investment decision and invested in KT = K⇤P . The welfare obtained from anticipat-
ing the PC’s decision and investing in the lower of the two optimal capacities is equal to
VTSO(✓0, ✓0,min(K⇤T , K
⇤
P )).
Therewith, the welfare loss from not taking the PC’s optimal investment decision into
account expressed in percentage is equal to:
Welfare loss =
VTSO(✓0, ✓0,min(K⇤T , K
⇤
P ))  VTSO(✓0, ✓0, K)
VTSO(✓0, ✓0,min(K⇤T , K
⇤
P ))
. (96)
16K is used in the dependency bracket as the two agents install di↵erent capacities.
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As shown in Figure 8, the absolute value of the welfare loss is strictly increasing in ✓0 when
K⇤P < K
⇤
T . However, the loss expressed in percentage is decreasing in ✓0. This is because the
loss from having overinvested,  (K⇤T  K⇤P ), constitutes a diminishing part of the welfare the
TSO could have achieved if it instead anticipated the PC’s decision, i.e., the denominator
in Equation (96), when ✓0 increases.
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Figure 8: Absolute welfare loss (left) and percentage welfare loss (right) if the TSO does
not take into account that the PC has flexibility to decide capacity as a function of ✓0 for
the base case parameters in the case of now-or-never investments.
6.2.2 With timing flexibility
Here, we extend the model from Section 6.2.1 by providing both agents with timing flexi-
bility. As in Section 6.1.2, we compare sub-problems 2 and 3 where in sub-problem 2 the
PC decides capacity for both agents, while in sub-problem 3 the TSO decides.
Figure 6 shows that it is optimal for the TSO that both agents invest in a larger capacity
at a later point in time than what is optimal for the PC. Consequently, if the TSO wrongly
assumes that the PC will install a generation capacity equal to the optimal capacity of the
transmission line exceeding K0, i.e., KP = K⇤T , the TSO will install a capacity of K
⇤
T as
shown in Figure 6, and invest at ✓⇤T (K
⇤
T ). The TSO will then expect the PC to wait until
✓⇤P (K
⇤
T ) and invest in K
⇤
T (✓
⇤
T ). However, the PC will obtain a higher value by investing
immediately after the TSO, i.e., ✓P = ✓⇤T , in a capacity of size K
⇤
P (✓
⇤
T ) as shown in Figure 9.
Therefore, if the TSO disregards that the PC can choose its own optimal capacity size ,
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Figure 9: Optimal capacities (left) and value of the PC (right) as functions of   for the base
case parameters when including timing flexibility for both agents.
the present value of the total surplus is equal to the following expression17:
VTSO(✓
⇤
T , ✓
⇤
T , K) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h1
2
⌘(K0 +min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P ))
2
+(1 ⌘(K0+min(K⇤T , K⇤P )))(K0+min(K⇤T , K⇤P ))
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵  (K0+K
⇤
T )  min(K⇤T , K⇤P )
 
.
(97)
However, if it anticipates that the PC will invest in a lower capacity, the resulting total
surplus will be equal to VTSO(✓⇤T , ✓
⇤
P ,min(K
⇤
P , K
⇤
T )). Therewith, the welfare loss for the
TSO from not anticipating the investment decision of the PC, expressed in percentage, is
equal to:
Welfare loss =
VTSO(✓⇤T , ✓
⇤
P ,min(K
⇤
P , K
⇤
T ))  VTSO(✓⇤T , ✓⇤T , K)
VTSO(✓⇤T , ✓
⇤
P ,min(K
⇤
P , K
⇤
T ))
. (98)
As shown in Figure 10, the absolute welfare loss for the TSO from not taking into account
that the PC can choose its optimal capacity is increasing in uncertainty. Furthermore, the
percentage welfare loss is between 3 and 5% for the levels of uncertainty considered. When
there is no uncertainty the TSO will invest when ✓t hits ✓⇤T = 6, which can be seen from
Figure 6. Then the welfare loss from not anticipating the PC’s investment decision is around
5%. Comparing this number to the case where both agents face a now-or-never investment
decision, we see that the welfare loss from not anticipating the PC’s investment decision
17K is used in the dependency bracket as the two agents install di↵erent capacities.
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is higher, and around 11%, for an initial demand level of ✓0 = 6. This suggests that the
welfare loss from not anticipating the PC’s decision is lower when both agents have timing
flexibility. This is because the di↵erence in the two agents’ optimal capacities is larger when
they both have to invest at time zero, than when the PC can delay its investment beyond
the investment time of the TSO. The reason for this is that the PC’s optimal capacity is
increasing in the demand level, see Proposition 9. Therefore, when it delays investment, it
will invest in a larger capacity closer to the optimal capacity of the TSO, compared to if it
had to invest at time zero.
Proposition 9 The optimal capacity of the PC is strictly increasing in the demand level
upon investment:
dK⇤P
d✓t
=
1
2⌘
 (⇢  ↵)
✓2t
> 0. (99)
Figure 10: Absolute welfare loss (left) and percentage welfare loss (right) if the TSO does
not take into account that the PC has flexibility to decide capacity as a function of   for
the base case parameters with timing flexibility for both agents.
6.3 Welfare loss from the TSO not having timing flexibility
Flexibility in timing is valuable for the TSO due to two reasons. 1) The option value from
being able to choose its optimal investment timing rather than having to make a now-
or-never investment decision, and 2) the strategic value from being able to postpone the
investment timing of the PC through its own investment timing. Since K⇤P is increasing
in ✓P , see Proposition 9, the PC will invest in a larger capacity if it is forced to delay
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investment. However, when the TSO has to make a now-or-never decision, it can only a↵ect
the PC’s investment decision through its own capacity choice. The optimal triggers and
capacities for sub-problem 4, which is described here, are given in Appendix C.4.
Using the base case parameters, we get the numerical results shown in Figure 11 for a
current demand level of ✓0 = 3. This demand level is chosen because at ✓0 < 3 K⇤T = 0, i.e.,
it is not optimal for the TSO to invest in a larger capacity than K0, and consequently, the
PC will never expand its generation capacity. Figure 11 shows that the TSO will be able to
a↵ect the PC’s investment decision through its capacity choice when uncertainty is relatively
low, i.e., the PC will be forced to invest in a lower capacity than it finds optimal, KP = K⇤T ,
and will therefore invest at an earlier point in time than it would find optimal if it could
transmit an amount of power equal to K⇤P . On the other hand, K
⇤
P will be dominating when
Figure 11: Optimal capacities (left) and optimal investment thresholds for the PC (right)
when the TSO does not have timing flexibility as functions of   for the base case parameters
and ✓0 = 3.
uncertainty is high, and then the TSO will not be able to a↵ect the PC’s decision through
its capacity choice. For all uncertainties, the PC will choose to delay investment compared
to the TSO that has to invest immediately at ✓0 = 3. This is because the current demand
level is too low for it to be optimal for the PC to expand generation capacity. Moreover, the
value of waiting to get more information increases for the PC when uncertainty increases.
The welfare loss due to the inability for the TSO to choose its own investment time is
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defined as18:
Welfare loss =
VTSO(✓⇤T , ✓
⇤
P ,min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P ))  VTSO(✓0, ✓⇤P ,min(K⇤T , K⇤P )
VTSO(✓⇤T , ✓
⇤
P ,min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P ))
, (100)
which is equal to the percentage di↵erence between the welfare from solving the full problem,
where both agents have timing and sizing flexibility, and the welfare when the TSO cannot
decide timing and has to make a now-or-never investment decision.
By varying the value of ✓0, we reveal how the welfare loss changes depending on the
current demand level. The results are shown in Figure 12. We find that the welfare loss
Figure 12: Percentage welfare loss when the
TSO does not have timing flexibility as a
function of the current demand level, ✓0, for
the base case parameters.
with regards to ✓0 is largest if the TSO is forced to invest when the value of ✓0 is very
low. For ✓0 < 3, K⇤T = 0 and the welfare loss is very high as the PC will never expand its
generation capacity, i.e. ✓⇤P (0) =1. Furthermore, for low demand levels above ✓0 = 3, the
TSO can only justify to install a small capacity. For ✓0 = 8.3 the welfare loss is equal to
zero as it would be optimal for the TSO to invest immediately at this demand level if it
had timing flexibility. The welfare loss first decreases steeply for low values of ✓0, while it
increases for high values at a more moderate rate. This is because for low demand levels,
the TSO loses both the real option value of postponing investment and the strategic value
of being able to a↵ect the PC’s investment decision thorough its timing choice. For higher
18Here, we have refrained from writing the triggers’ dependency on min(K⇤T ,K
⇤
P ) for readability.
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demand levels the TSO is forced to invest at a sup-optimal point in time, since it optimally
would invest earlier. However, the TSO will be able to get the strategic value from making
the PC delay investment and hence invest in a larger capacity. The strategic e↵ect will
mitigate the welfare loss from having to invest at a sub-optimal time.
The results show that when the TSO does not have timing flexibility, it can lead to a
significant loss in social welfare compared to when it does have this flexibility.
6.4 Welfare loss from disregarding the PC’s flexibility to choose
timing
In Appendix C.5, the optimal investment strategies for sub-problem 5 where both agents
have sizing flexibility, but only the TSO has timing flexibility is presented. In this sub-
problem, it is assumed that the PC will invest at the same time as the TSO. Following
the optimal investment strategy from solving this problem and ignoring that the PC has
timing flexibility, will only be optimal for the TSO if the optimal investment trigger of the
PC, ✓⇤P , is not larger than that of the TSO, ✓
⇤
T . For parameter sets where the inequality
in Proposition 7 holds, the PC will delay its investment beyond the investment time of the
TSO if the expansion has to be of size K, i.e., ✓⇤P (K) > ✓
⇤
T (K). Consequently, in these cases
the TSO will su↵er a welfare loss from not taking into account that the PC can choose to
delay investment.
We define the percentage welfare loss from not considering the PC’s timing flexibility
as19:
Welfare loss =
VTSO(✓⇤T , ✓
⇤
P ,min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P ))  VTSO(✓⇤T , ✓⇤T ,min(K⇤T , K⇤P )
VTSO(✓⇤T , ✓
⇤
P ,min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P ))
, (101)
which is the di↵erence between the welfare achieved following the optimal strategy from the
full model and the welfare achieved when the TSO follows its optimal investment strategy
from sub-problem 5 while the PC actually chooses to delay investment and invest at ✓⇤P > ✓
⇤
T .
For the parameters in the base case, the inequality in Proposition 7 does hold, i.e., the
PC will want to delay investment compared to the TSO. Hence there will be a welfare loss
from assuming that the PC invests at the same time as the TSO. The numerical results are
shown in Figure 13 and 1420.
19Also here we have refrained from writing the triggers’ dependency on min(K⇤T ,K
⇤
P ) for readability.
20K⇤T is not included in the graphs because it in both cases will be higher than K
⇤
P , i.e., K
⇤
P is the
dominating capacity.
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Figure 13: Comparison of optimal capacities for the PC (left) and the optimal investment
thresholds for the PC and the TSO (right) as functions of   for the base case parameters
when the TSO considers the PC’s timing flexibility and when it does not.
Figure 14: Percentage welfare loss from as-
suming that the PC invests at the same time
as the TSO while it actually delays invest-
ment as a function of   for the base case
parameters.
The numerical results show that the TSO will underinvest if it does not take into account
that the PC can delay investment. Since the capacity is increasing in the demand level, see
Proposition 9, the PC will want to invest in a larger capacity given that it delays investment
compared to if it has to invest at the same time as the TSO. When the TSO invests in
K⇤P (✓
⇤
T ), it sets an upper bound for the PC and prevents it from investing in its own optimal
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capacity, K⇤P (✓
⇤
P ), which is higher. This leads to a loss in social welfare compared to if it
anticipates that the PC will want to delay investment and invest in a larger capacity. From
Figure 14, we see that the loss is decreasing in uncertainty. This is because the di↵erence
in the two optimal capacities is decreasing in uncertainty, as illustrated in Figure 13. When
the di↵erence between the capacity the TSO assumes the PC will install and the capacity
the PC will optimally install decreases, the welfare loss from wrongly assuming that the PC
will invest at the same time also decreases. Note that the welfare loss for the TSO from
disregarding the PC’s flexibility to choose its own timing is never above 2 % and hence
is lower than the welfare loss from disregarding that the PC can choose its own capacity,
which is between 3 and 5%.
6.5 Results of the full model
The numerical results from solving the full model where both agents have timing and sizing
flexibility are shown in Figure 15 for the base case parameters. We see that the TSO,
if it has the power to decide, will want to invest in a larger capacity at a later point in
time than the PC. But since the PC’s capacity will be dominating, the TSO anticipates
this capacity choice and invests in the same capacity. Furthermore, the TSO will find its
Figure 15: Optimal capacities (left) and the optimal investment threshold of the PC and
the initial and final optimal investment thresholds for the TSO (right) when both agents
have timing and sizing flexibility as functions of   for the base case parameters.
optimal investment timing based on the PC’s capacity choice, K⇤P . Since ✓
⇤
T (K
⇤
P ) < ✓
⇤
P (K
⇤
P ),
the TSO will choose to invest earlier than the PC as shown in Figure 15. When investing
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before the PC, the TSO gains welfare from the existing generation capacity, K0, before the
PC undertakes its expansion.
Figure 16: Social welfare and the value of
the PC as functions of   for the base case
parameters.
As Dixit (1993), Dangl (1999) and Chronopoulos et al. (2015), we find that both the
size and the investment thresholds are increasing in uncertainty as can be seen from the
numerical results and Proposition 8. High uncertainty leads to a high value of waiting. This
delays investment with the implication that at the moment of investment the market has
grown enough to invest in a larger capacity. Figure 16 shows the welfare for the TSO and
the profit of the PC as functions of uncertainty. Both are increasing in uncertainty. It is
not possible to show analytically that the values are always increasing in uncertainty as it
depends on the parameter values and optimal values of the variables.
The numerical analysis of the full model with the base case parameters, shows that the
PC will not be bounded by the TSO on timing or capacity, see Outcome 3 in Table 3.
Rather the TSO must adapt to the PC’s decision, which is sub-optimal for the TSO. Hence,
it will be beneficial for the TSO if it can make the PC commit to install KP = K⇤T to avoid
that the PC invests in a capacity that is lower than what is optimal from a social welfare
perspective. In the next section, we analyse how the results from the full model changes
when we introduce a subsidy of the PC’s investment cost.
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6.6 Welfare gain from a subsidy of the PC’s investment cost
The numerical analysis of the full model suggests that given the base case parameters,
the PC has the dominating capacity and hence the power to decide the size of the TSO’s
investment. The TSO can choose to delay investment to make the PC invest later in a larger
capacity but, given the base case parameters, this is sub-optimal for the TSO. Therefore,
the TSO will seek to influence the PC to make it invest in a larger capacity to increase
social welfare. One way to give the PC an economic incentive to invest in a larger capacity
is through a subsidy of some of the PC’s investment costs. In the left panel of Figure 17,
we compare the optimal capacity of the PC in the case of no subsidy with the case where
50 % of the PC’s investment cost is subsidised by an external party, i.e.,   = 50.
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Figure 17: Optimal capacities in the case of no subsidy,   = 100, and a 50 % subsidy,   = 50
(left) and the percentage gain in welfare from a 50 % subsidy (right) as functions of  .
We find that when   is reduced by 50%, the PC invests in a larger capacity. This will result
in a higher social welfare. Since we assume that the subsidy is paid by an external party,
the gain in total surplus from providing a subsidy, expressed in percentage, is defined as21:
Welfare gain =
VTSO,with subsidy   VTSO,without subsidy
VTSO,without subsidy
. (102)
The percentage gain from providing a subsidy is shown in the right panel of Figure 17.
The welfare gain is decreasing in uncertainty. This is because the di↵erence between the
21If the subsidy was not paid by an external party, then the cost of the subsidy should have been included
when calculating total surplus to find whether the subsidy provided a net increase in social welfare or not.
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capacity the PC will install with and without the subsidy is decreasing in uncertainty. This
can be seen from the left panel of Figure 17. The analysis shows that a subsidy of the PC’s
investment cost increases the optimal capacity of the PC and hence social welfare.
In Figure 18, we extend the analysis by studying how the optimal capacities and thresh-
olds change with di↵erent subsidy levels22. We find that an increasing subsidy level not
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Figure 18: Optimal capacity (left) and the optimal investment threshold (right) for a subsidy
between 40 and 100% for the base case parameters.
only increases the optimal capacity expansion of the PC, it also triggers earlier investment.
When more than 40% of the PC’s investment cost is subsidised by an external party, it
becomes optimal for the PC to invest as soon as the TSO has invested instead of waiting.
Therefore, the investment timing of the PC is equal the TSO’s as shown in the right panel
of Figure 18. Also, the TSOs investment timing is decreasing with increasing subsidy level
as the investment cost of the PC, which the TSO takes into account when finding the in-
vestment trigger that maximise social welfare, decreases. Hence, not only does a subsidy of
more than 40% of the PC’s investment cost increase the optimal capacity, it also triggers
earlier investment by the PC than in the case of no subsidy.
Last, we evaluate how the percentage gain in welfare from a subsidy varies with the size
of the subsidy as shown in Figure 19. The gain in welfare is increasing when the subsidy
increases. We conclude that a subsidy might be a tool to make the PC invest in a larger
capacity at an earlier point in time to increase total surplus.
22We find that K⇤P is the dominating capacity for all levels of subsidy. Therefore, K
⇤
T is not included in
the graph.
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Figure 19: The percentage gain in welfare
from a subsidy between 40 and 100% for the
base case parameters.
7 Conclusion
This paper extends the theoretical real options literature by considering a two-firm setting
with di↵erent objectives. In particular, we determine the optimal timing and sizing strategy
of a welfare-maximising TSO taking into account the optimal timing and sizing decision of
a profit-maximising PC.
We find that disregarding the PC’s optimal investment decision can have a large negative
impact on social welfare for a TSO. This is because, in most cases, the TSO will want both
agents to invest in a larger capacity than what is optimal for the PC. This implies that the
TSO faces a risk of investing in transmission capacity that will be left unused by the PC
if it does not consider the PCs’ optimal capacity decision. The only time we find that the
optimal capacity of the TSO is less than that of the PC is if the TSO does not have timing
flexibility and is forced to invest at a low demand level. Then, for low uncertainties, the
optimal capacity of the TSO is dominating. Furthermore, we find that if the TSO considers
only the PC’s sizing flexibility and not the flexibility in timing, then it risks investing in a
too small capacity. This is because the PC would optimally want to delay investment, and,
therefore, invest in a larger capacity than the TSO anticipates it to install if it assumes that
the PC invests at the same time as itself.
We find that increased demand uncertainty leads to an increase in optimal capacity and
a delay in investment because of the increased value of waiting. This is similar to what has
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been shown in previous real options literature with respect to timing and sizing. Also the
welfare loss from not taking the PC’s optimal investment decision into account increases in
uncertainty.
We find that not only does a subsidy of the PC’s investment cost increase the optimal
capacity, but it also triggers earlier investment by the PC. Therefore, a subsidy can be
used as a tool to increase social welfare. The analysis can be a starting point for a more
comprehensive study to find the optimal subsidy level given that the cost of the subsidy is
taken into account in the calculation of the total surplus. Furthermore, one could analyse
the e↵ect of providing a subsidy only above a certain capacity level. A similar approach
to Boomsma et al. (2012) could also be incorporated into the model to study how di↵erent
support schemes a↵ect the optimal investment decision of the PC, and thereby the optimal
strategy of the TSO.
The model could be extended by introducing volume flexibility, i.e., relax the assumption
that the PC produces up to capacity. It would be interesting to study as it might cause the
PC to invest in a larger capacity and hence shift the current power structure from the PC
having the dominating capacity, in most cases, to the TSO. However, this extension would
likewise be at the expense of being able to obtain an analytical solution.
Finally, it would be interesting to apply the model in a case study. Then, it would
be necessary to do an empirical analysis to find more realistic parameters for both agents’
investment cost, variable and fixed production costs, drift and discount rates. One could
expect the two companies to have di↵erent discount rates. Also the price process for the
considered market should be evaluated to reveal if it really follows a GBM or if it is mean-
reverting.
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Appendix
A Detailed derivations
A.1 Derivation of and solution to the VM and SP conditions in
Section 5.1.1
To determine the investment threshold ✓⇤P and the endogenous constant A1, we employ the
value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions:
A1✓
⇤ 1
P + V1(✓
⇤
P , K0) = V2(✓
⇤
P , K0 +K
⇤
P (✓
⇤
P )), (A.1)
A1 1✓
⇤ 1 1
P +
dV1
d✓t
    
✓t=✓⇤P
=
@V2
@✓t
    
✓t=✓⇤P
+
@V2
@KP
@K⇤P
@✓t
    
✓t=✓⇤P
. (A.2)
Note that K⇤P depends on ✓
⇤
P . However, after maximising the present value of the PC after
investment, V2(✓⇤P , K0+K
⇤
P (✓
⇤
P )), with respect to KP , for a given value of the demand shift
parameter at the time of investment, ✓t, by the envelope theorem we have that
@V2
@K⇤P
= 0.
The smooth-pasting condition reduces to:
A1 1✓
⇤ 1 1
P +
dV1
d✓t
    
✓t=✓⇤P
=
@V2
@✓t
    
✓t=✓⇤P
. (A.3)
The smooth-pasting condition gives the value of the endogenous constant A1:
A1 =
K⇤P (✓
⇤
P )(1  ⌘(2K0 +K⇤P (✓⇤P )))
⇢  ↵
1
 1
✓⇤1  1P . (A.4)
Substituting the expression for A1 into the value-matching condition and solving for ✓⇤P , we
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get that the optimal investment threshold is given by the solution to the following implicit
equation:
✓ˆ⇤P =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 
1  ⌘(2K0 +K⇤P (✓ˆ⇤P ))
. (A.5)
A.2 Derivation of and solution to the VM and SP conditions in
Section 5.1.2
To determine the optimal investment threshold ✓⇤T and the value of the endogenous constant
B1, we employ the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions. First, the value-matching
condition is given by:
B1✓
⇤ 1
T = TS(✓
⇤
T , K
⇤
T (✓
⇤
T ), ✓
⇤
P (K
⇤
T (✓
⇤
T )). (A.6)
If we substitute for ✓⇤P (K
⇤
T ) into the expression for the total surplus, then we can write the
value-matching condition as:
B1✓
⇤ 1
T = TS(✓
⇤
T , K
⇤
T (✓
⇤
T )). (A.7)
When deriving the smooth-pasting condition, one has to take into account that K⇤T depends
on ✓T . Therefore, when deriving the smooth-pasting condition we get:
B1 1✓
⇤ 1 1
T =
@TS
@✓t
    
✓t=✓⇤T
+
@TS
@KT
@K⇤T
@✓t
    
✓t=✓⇤T
. (A.8)
However, after maximising the total surplus (TS), where we have substituted the optimal
✓⇤P (KT ), with respect to KT , by the envelope theorem we have that
@TS
@KT
= 0, see Equation
(41). Therefore, the smooth-pasting condition reduces to:
B1 1✓
⇤ 1 1
T =
@TS
@✓t
    
✓t=✓⇤T
. (A.9)
The smooth-pasting condition gives:
B1 =

K0   1
2
⌘K20
 
✓⇤1  1T
 1(⇢  ↵) +

K⇤T (✓
⇤
T )(1  ⌘(K0  
1
2
K⇤T (✓
⇤
T )))
 
✓P (K⇤T )
⇤1  1
⇢  ↵
   K⇤T (✓⇤T )✓P (K⇤T )⇤  1 . (A.10)
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Substituting the expression for B1 into the value-matching condition and solving for ✓⇤T , we
get that the optimal investment threshold is given by the solution to the following implicit
equation:
✓⇤T =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 (K0 +K⇤T (✓
⇤
T ))
K0(1  12⌘K0)
. (A.11)
A.3 Derivation of and solution to the VM and SP conditions cor-
responding to the corner solution in Section 5.1.2
To determine the indi↵erence level ✓⇤T and the value of the endogenous constant B1, we em-
ploy the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions. First, the value-matching condition
is given by:
B1✓
⇤ 1
T = TS(✓
⇤
T , K
⇤
T (✓
⇤
T )). (A.12)
where the total expected surplus is equal to:
TS(✓t, KT , ✓
⇤
P ) =

1
2
⌘(K0+KT )
2+(1 ⌘(K0+KT ))(K0+KT )
 
✓t
⇢  ↵   (K0+KT )  KT .
(A.13)
Next, when deriving the smooth-pasting condition, one has to take into account that K⇤T
depends on ✓T . We get:
B1 1✓
⇤ 1 1
T =
@TS
@✓t
    
✓t=✓⇤T
+
@TS
@KT
@K⇤T
@✓t
    
✓t=✓⇤T
. (A.14)
However, after maximising the total surplus (TS) with respect to KT we have that
@TS
@KT
= 0
and the smooth-pasting condition reduces to:
B1 1✓
⇤ 1 1
T =
@TS
@✓t
    
✓t=✓⇤T
. (A.15)
By solving the value-matching and smooth pasting conditions we find the following expres-
sion for B1:
B1 =

(K0 +K
⇤
T (✓
⇤
T ))(1 
1
2
⌘(K0 +K
⇤
T (✓
⇤
T )))
 
✓⇤1  1T
 1(⇢  ↵) , (A.16)
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The optimal investment threshold is given by the solution to the following implicit equation:
✓⇤T =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 (K0 +K⇤T (✓
⇤
T )) +  K
⇤
T (✓
⇤
T )
(K0 +K⇤T (✓
⇤
T ))(1  12⌘(K0 +K⇤T (✓⇤T )))
. (A.17)
B Proofs of Propositions
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is given in Section 5.1.1.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is given in Section 5.1.2.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is given in Section 5.1.2.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of the optimal investment strategies in the region where ✓⇤T (K
⇤
P ) < ✓
⇤
P (K
⇤
P ) is
given in Section 5.1.1 and 5.2.2. However here we derive the proof of the optimal investment
strategies when we assume that the corner solution ✓P (K⇤P ) = ✓
⇤
T (K
⇤
P ) is optimal.
In this case, the PC holds only the option to decide capacity, not timing, and will have
to follow the TSO’s investment timing strategy. The investment problem of the PC at time
zero is equal to:
max
KP
E
 Z 1
s=⌧T
e ⇢s⇡(✓s, K0 +KP )ds  e ⇢⌧P  KP
   ✓0 . (B.1)
The optimal K⇤P is given by the same expression as in Section 5.1.1, except that it depends
on ✓⇤T in this case, therefore, K
⇤
P is given by:
K⇤P (✓
⇤
T ) = max
✓
1
2⌘

1   (⇢  ↵)
✓⇤T
 
 K0, 0
◆
. (B.2)
To find the TSO’s optimal investment time, we need to solve its optimal stopping problem.
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At time zero it is equal to:
sup
⌧T
E
 Z 1
s=⌧T
e ⇢sts(✓s;K0 +K⇤P )ds  e ⇢⌧T  (K0 +K⇤P )  e ⇢⌧T  (K⇤P )
   ✓0 . (B.3)
We follow a dynamic programming approach to solve the optimal stopping problem. The
value for the TSO, F , at time t is equal to:
F (✓t, K
⇤
T (✓t)) =
8<: B1✓ 1t if ✓t  ✓T ,TS(✓t, K⇤P (✓t)) if ✓T  ✓t, (B.4)
where the value in the continuation region is derived by finding the solution to the ordinary
di↵erential equation (ODE) that stews from the Bellman equation:
⇢Fdt = E[dF ]. (B.5)
Standard calculations similar to those in Section 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 are performed, which lead
to the value function stated in Equation (B.4).
In order to find the TSO’s optimal investment time, we need to determine the optimal
investment threshold, ✓⇤T , and the value of the endogenous constant B1 by employing the
value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions. First, the value-matching condition is given
by:
B1✓
⇤ 1
T = TS(✓
⇤
T , K
⇤
P (✓
⇤
T )), (B.6)
where the total expected surplus at time ⌧ ⇤T , given that both invest at the same time, is
equal to:
TS(✓⇤T , K
⇤
P (✓
⇤
T )) =

1
2
⌘(K0 +K
⇤
P (✓
⇤
T ))
2 + (1  ⌘(K0 +K⇤P (✓⇤T )))(K0 +K⇤P (✓⇤T ))
 
✓⇤T
⇢  ↵
   (K0 +K⇤P (✓⇤T ))   K⇤P (✓⇤T ). (B.7)
Next, when deriving the smooth-pasting condition, one has to take into account that K⇤P
depends on ✓T . We get:
B1 1✓
⇤ 1 1
T =
@TS
@✓t
    
✓t=✓⇤T
+
@TS
@KP
@KP
@✓t
    
✓t=✓⇤T
. (B.8)
62
As K⇤P is chosen to maximise profit not total surplus, we do not have that
dTS
dKP
= 0 as in
the previous cases, but that d⇡dKP = 0, thus the smooth-pasting condition does not reduce in
this case. The smooth pasting condition gives:
B1 =
1
 1

(K0 +K⇤P (✓
⇤
T )(1  12⌘(K0 +K⇤P (✓⇤T )))
⇢  ↵ +
h1  ⌘(K0 +K⇤P (✓⇤T ))
⇢  ↵ ✓
⇤
T        
i
⇤
1
2⌘
 (⇢  ↵)
✓⇤2T
 
✓⇤1  1T . (B.9)
Substituting the expression for B1 into the value-matching condition, we get the following
implicit equation for the optimal investment level, ✓⇤T :
 1   1
 1
(K0 +K⇤P (✓
⇤
T )(1  12⌘(K0 +K⇤P (✓⇤T )))
⇢  ↵ ✓
⇤2
T
 

 (K0 +K
⇤
P (✓
⇤
T )) +  K
⇤
P (✓
⇤
T ) +
 (1  ⌘(K0 +K⇤P (✓⇤T ))
2⌘ 1
 
✓⇤T +
 (  +  )(⇢  ↵)
2⌘ 1
= 0.
(B.10)
B.5 Proof of Proposition 5
We find that if both agents invest at time zero, the total optimal capacity of the TSO will
be larger than the total optimal capacity of the PC if:
1
⌘
 (⇢  ↵)
✓0
< K0 +K
⇤
P . (B.11)
By substituting K⇤P , given in Equation (82), into the equation above, we find that in order
for K⇤T to be larger than K
⇤
P Equation (86) must hold.
B.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Given that ✓⇤P (K) > ✓
⇤
T (K) the following holds:
@✓⇤P (K)
@K
=
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 ⌘
(1  ⌘(2K0 +K))2 > 0, (B.12)
and:
@✓⇤T (K)
@K
=
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 
1
2⌘K
2
0 + (1  ⌘K0)K0
> 0. (B.13)
Note that (1   ⌘K0) > 0 has to hold due to the upper bound on capacity given by the
inverse demand function, see Equation(1).
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B.7 Proof of Proposition 7
In the case where the two agents invest in the same capacity, K, and the PC invests after
the TSO we have the following investment triggers for the two agents:
✓⇤T (K) =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 (K0 +K)
K0(1  12⌘K0)
, (B.14)
✓⇤P (K) =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 
1  ⌘(2K0 +K) . (B.15)
By solving the inequality ✓⇤P (K) > ✓
⇤
T (K), we can derive an expression for when the PC will
delay investment beyond the investment threshold of the TSO. The relation is equal to:
 
 
>
(K0 +K)(1  ⌘(2K0 +K))
K0(1  12⌘K0)
. (B.16)
.
B.8 Proof of Proposition 8
Given that the PC invests after the TSO we have the following investment triggers for the
two agents:
✓⇤T (K) =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 (K0 +K)
K0(1  12⌘K0)
(B.17)
✓⇤P (K) =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 
1  ⌘(2K0 +K) (B.18)
First, ✓⇤T (K) is evaluated. The total derivative of ✓T with respect to   is equal to:
d✓⇤T
d 
=
@✓⇤T
@ 
+
@✓⇤T
@ 
@ 
@ 
. (B.19)
From Equation (B.17), we have that
@✓⇤T
@  = 0. Furthermore;
@✓⇤T
@ 
=
 1
( 1   1)2 (⇢  ↵)
 (K0 +K)
K0(1  12⌘K0)
< 0. (B.20)
Also @ @  < 0. The proof can be found in Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Therewith, we have
that:
d✓⇤T
d 
> 0. (B.21)
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Next, ✓⇤P (K) is evaluated. The total derivative of ✓P with respect to   is equal to:
d✓⇤P
d 
=
@✓⇤P
@ 
+
@✓⇤P
@ 
@ 
@ 
> 0, (B.22)
From Equation (B.18), we have that
@✓⇤P
@  = 0. Furthermore;
@✓⇤P
@ 
=
 1
( 1   1)2 (⇢  ↵)
 
1  ⌘(2K0 +K) < 0. (B.23)
Therewith, we have that:
d✓⇤P
d 
> 0. (B.24)
It is also possible to show that the optimal capacity of the PC is increasing in uncer-
tainty. This holds independent of whether it has to invest at its own or the TSO’s optimal
investment threshold.
K⇤P (✓t) = max
✓
1
2⌘

1   (⇢  ↵)
✓t
 
 K0, 0
◆
. (B.25)
First we have that:
dK⇤P (✓
⇤
P )
d 
=
@K⇤P
@ 
+
@K⇤P
@✓⇤P
@✓⇤P
@ 
. (B.26)
From Equation (B.25), we see that
@K⇤P
@  = 0. Furthermore, from Equation (B.24) we have
that
@✓⇤P
@  > 0. Also:
@K⇤P
@✓P
=
1
2⌘
 (⇢  ↵)
✓2P
> 0. (B.27)
Therewith, we have that:
dK⇤P (✓
⇤
P )
d 
> 0, (B.28)
Similarly we have that:
dK⇤P (✓
⇤
T )
d 
=
@K⇤P
@ 
+
@K⇤P
@✓⇤T
@✓⇤P
@ 
> 0, (B.29)
since
d✓⇤T
d  > 0.
B.9 Proof of Proposition 9
The proof is given in Section 6.3.
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C Analytical Solutions to the Sub-Problems
C.1 Sub-problem 1: Optimal capacity for each agent when they
both have to invest at time zero
C.1.1 PC’s investment problem
When the PC only has sizing flexibility, and has to invest at time zero, its now-or-never
investment problem is equal to:
max
KP
E
 Z 1
s=0
e ⇢s⇡(✓s, K0 +KP )ds   KP
   ✓0 . (C.1)
The solution to this problem is equal to Equation (13) but with ✓0 instead of ✓t:
K⇤P (✓0) = max
✓
1
2⌘

1   (⇢  ↵)
✓0
 
 K0, 0
◆
. (C.2)
C.1.2 TSO’s investment problem
When also the PC has to invest at the zero, the TSO’s now-or-never investment problem is
equal to:
max
KT
E
 Z 1
s=0
e ⇢sts(✓s;K0 +KT )ds   (K0 +KT )   KT
   ✓0 , (C.3)
or equivalently:
max
KT
E

TS(✓0;K0 +KT )
   ✓0 , (C.4)
where total surplus is defined as the sum of the consumer surplus and the producer surplus.
Building on the theory in Section 3, the present value of the total expected consumer
surplus (CS) at time zero is equal to:
CS(✓0;K0 +KT ) = E
 Z 1
s=0
e ⇢s
1
2
✓s(K0 +KT )
2⌘ds
   ✓0  = ✓0(K0 +KT )2⌘
2(⇢  ↵) . (C.5)
As discussed under assumptions, the total expected producer surplus (PS) is equal to the
expected present value of the PC’s future income minus the PC’s and the TSO’s investment
cost. At time zero we have:
PS(✓0;K0 +KT ) =
✓0(1  ⌘(K0 +KT ))(K0 +KT )
⇢  ↵    KT    (K0 +KT ). (C.6)
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The total expected surplus at time zero, TS(✓0;K0 +KT ), is then equal to:
TS(✓0;K0 +KT ) = CS(✓0, K0 +KT ) + PS(✓0;K0 +KT )
=
✓0(K0 +KT )(2  ⌘(K0 +KT ))
2(⇢  ↵)    KT    (K0 +KT ). (C.7)
Next, we solve the TSO’s investment problem to obtain K⇤T :
max
KT

TS(✓0;K0 +KT )
 
(C.8)
d
dKT

✓0(K0 +KT )(2  ⌘(K0 +KT )
2(⇢  ↵)    KT    (K0 +KT )
 
= 0 (C.9)
✓0
2(⇢  ↵)
⇥  ⌘K0 + 2  ⌘K0   2⌘KT ⇤        = 0 (C.10)
Then the optimal Kˆ⇤T is equal to:
Kˆ⇤T (✓0) =
1
⌘

1  (  +  )(⇢  ↵)
✓0
 
 K0. (C.11)
However, we require the TSO to at least be able to distribute an amount of power equal to
the current capacity of the PC, K0. Therefore, K⇤T is given by:
K⇤T (✓0) = max
✓
1
⌘

1  (  +  )(⇢  ↵)
✓0
 
 K0, 0
◆
. (C.12)
C.1.3 Optimal investment strategies
The optimal investment strategies of the two agents depend on the lower of the two agents’
optimal capacities. If both agents invest in the dominating capacity, i.e., the lower optimal
capacity, the resulting social welfare for the TSO will be:
VTSO(✓0, ✓0,min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P )) =h1
2
⌘(K0 +min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P ))
2 + (1  ⌘(K0 +min(K⇤T , K⇤P )))(K0 +min(K⇤T , K⇤P ))
i ✓0
⇢  ↵
   (K0 +min(K⇤T , K⇤P ))   min(K⇤T , K⇤P ). (C.13)
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And the value of the PC:
VPC(✓0, ✓0,min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P )) =h
(1  ⌘(K0 +min(K⇤T , K⇤P )))(K0 +min(K⇤T , K⇤P ))
i ✓0
⇢  ↵    min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P ). (C.14)
C.2 Sub-problem 2: Both decide timing, while the TSO decides
capacity, KP = K⇤T
C.2.1 PC’s investment problem
When the PC only has timing flexibility, its investment problem at time zero is equal to:
sup
⌧P ⌧T
E
 Z 1
s=⌧T
e ⇢s⇡(✓s, K0)ds+
Z 1
s=⌧P
e ⇢s[⇡(✓s, K0 +K⇤T )  ⇡(✓s, K0)]ds  e ⇢⌧P  K⇤T
   ✓0 ,
(C.15)
where K⇤T is the optimal capacity of the TSO. The solution to this optimal stopping problem
is equal to the solution derived in Section 5.1.1, i.e., Equation (23) and (24), but with K⇤T
instead of K⇤P :
A1 =
K⇤T (1  ⌘(2K0 +K⇤T ))
⇢  ↵
1
 1
✓ˆ⇤1  1P , (C.16)
and:
✓ˆ⇤P =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 
1  ⌘(2K0 +K⇤T )
. (C.17)
Taking the timing constraint into account, we get that the optimal investment timing of
the PC given the TSO’s investment time is equal to:
✓⇤P =
8<: ✓ˆ⇤P if ✓T < ✓ˆ⇤P ,✓T if ✓T   ✓ˆ⇤P . (C.18)
In the case whereK⇤T is equal to zero, generation capacity will never be added, i.e., ✓
⇤
P (0)=1.
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C.2.2 TSO’s investment problem
The TSO’s investment problem at time zero, given that it has both sizing and timing
flexibility, is equal to:
sup
⌧T
"
max
KT
E
 Z 1
s=⌧T
e ⇢sts(✓s;K0)ds  e ⇢⌧T  (K0 +KT )+Z 1
s=⌧P
e ⇢s[ts(✓s;K0 +KT )  ts(✓s;K0)]ds  e ⇢⌧P  KT
   ✓0 #. (C.19)
The solution to this problem is equal to the solution derived in Section 5.1.2. The optimal
capacity, K⇤T , after having substituted for ✓
⇤
P (K
⇤
T ) is equal to:
K⇤T (✓t) = max
 
Kˆ⇤T (✓t), 0
 
, (C.20)
where Kˆ⇤T (✓t) is given by the solution to the following implicit equation:
  +

  [2⌘Kˆ⇤T (⌘K0(    2)    + 1) + (2⌘K0   1)(2⌘K0(    2)    + 1])
2(    1)(⌘Kˆ⇤T + 2⌘K0   1)2
+
 
    1 
  
2
 
⇤
(    1)✓t(⌘Kˆ⇤T + 2⌘K0   1)
  (↵  ⇢)
 
= 0. (C.21)
The value of the endogenous constant B1 is equal to:
B1 =

K0   1
2
⌘K20
 
✓⇤1  1T
 1(⇢  ↵) +

K⇤T (✓
⇤
T )(1  ⌘(K0  
1
2
K⇤T (✓
⇤
T )))
 
✓⇤P (K
⇤
T )
⇤1  1
⇢  ↵
   K⇤T (✓⇤T )✓⇤P (K⇤T )⇤  1 , (C.22)
while the optimal investment threshold ✓⇤T is given by the solution to the following implicit
equation:
✓⇤T =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 (K0 +K⇤T (✓
⇤
T ))
K0(1  12⌘K0)
. (C.23)
The PC will then expand capacity when ✓t hits ✓⇤P (K
⇤
T ) given that it has no flexibility to
choose the size of its investment:
✓⇤P (K
⇤
T ) =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 K⇤T
1  ⌘(2K0 +K⇤T )
. (C.24)
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However, if this solution is not valid, i.e., ✓P (K⇤T ) < ✓
⇤
T (K
⇤
T ), we assume the corner solution
✓P = ✓⇤T to be optimal. The optimal investment strategy of the TSO given that they both
invest at the same time, is to invest in a capacity of:
K⇤T (✓
⇤
T ) = max
✓
1
⌘

1  (  +  )(⇢  ↵)
✓⇤T
 
 K0, 0
◆
, (C.25)
at the moment in time when ✓t hits ✓⇤T given by the solution to the following implicit
equation:
✓⇤T =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 (K0 +K⇤T (✓
⇤
T )) +  K
⇤
T (✓
⇤
T )
(K0 +K⇤T (✓
⇤
T ))(1  12⌘(K0 +K⇤T (✓⇤T )))
. (C.26)
The value of the endogenous constant B1 is equal to:
B1 =

K0   1
2
⌘K20
 
✓⇤1  1T
 1(⇢  ↵) +

K⇤T (✓
⇤
T )(1  ⌘(K0  
1
2
K⇤T (✓
⇤
T )))
 
✓⇤P (K
⇤
T )
⇤1  1
⇢  ↵
   K⇤T (✓⇤T )✓⇤P (K⇤T )⇤  1 . (C.27)
C.2.3 Optimal investment strategies
The optimal investment strategies for Sub-problem 2 are summarised in Table C.1.
If the PC invests after the TSO, the resulting value at time zero for each agent is equal
to:
VTSO(✓
⇤
T , ✓
⇤
P , K
⇤
T ) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h1
2
⌘K20 + (1  ⌘K0)K0
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵    (K0 +K
⇤
T )
+

1
2
⌘[(K0+K
⇤
T )
2 K20 ]+(1 ⌘(K0+K⇤T ))(K0+K⇤T )  (1 ⌘K0)K0
 
✓⇤P (K
⇤
T )
⇢  ↵
✓
✓⇤T
✓⇤P (K
⇤
T )
◆ 1
   K⇤T
✓
✓⇤T
✓⇤P (K
⇤
T )
◆ 1 
, (C.28)
VPC(✓
⇤
T , ✓
⇤
P , K
⇤
T ) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h
(1  ⌘K0)K0
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵
+
h
(1 ⌘(K0+K⇤T ))(K0+K⇤T )  (1 ⌘K0)K0
i✓⇤P (K⇤T )
⇢  ↵
✓
✓⇤T
✓⇤P (K
⇤
T )
◆ 1
  K⇤T
✓
✓⇤T
✓⇤P (K
⇤
T )
◆ 1 
.
(C.29)
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Optimal investment strategies Sub-problem 2
K⇤T
✓⇤P > ✓
⇤
T
TSO’s optimal strategy:
K⇤T = max
 
Kˆ⇤T (✓
⇤
T ), 0
 
, where Kˆ⇤T (✓
⇤
T ) is given by the following
implicit equation:
   +

  [2⌘Kˆ⇤T (⌘K0(  2)  +1)+(2⌘K0 1)(2⌘K0(  2)  +1])
2(  1)(⌘Kˆ⇤T+2⌘K0 1)2
+    1     2
 
⇤
(  1)✓⇤T (⌘Kˆ⇤T+2⌘K0 1)
  (↵ ⇢)
 
= 0
✓⇤T =
 1
 1 1(⇢  ↵)
 (K0+K⇤T (✓
⇤
T ))
K0(1  12⌘K0)
PC’s optimal decision:
KP = K⇤T
✓⇤P =
 1
 1 1(⇢  ↵)  1 ⌘(2K0+K⇤T )
✓P = ✓⇤T
TSO’s optimal strategy:
K⇤T = max
✓
1
⌘

1  ( + )(⇢ ↵)✓⇤T
 
 K0, 0
◆
✓⇤T =
 1
 1 1(⇢  ↵)
 (K0+K⇤T (✓
⇤
T ))+ K
⇤
T (✓
⇤
T )
(K0+K⇤T (✓
⇤
T ))(1  12⌘(K0+K⇤T (✓⇤T )))
PC’s optimal decision:
KP = K⇤T
✓P = ✓⇤T
Table C.1: Overview of optimal investment strategies for Sub-problem 2
If it is optimal for the PC to invest at the same time as the TSO, i.e., ✓P (K⇤T ) = ✓
⇤
T (K
⇤
T ),
the value functions simplify to:
VTSO(✓
⇤
T , ✓
⇤
T , K
⇤
T ) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h1
2
⌘(K0 +K
⇤
T )
2 + (1  ⌘(K0 +K⇤T ))(K0 +K⇤T )
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵
   (K0 +K⇤T )   K⇤T
 
, (C.30)
VPC(✓
⇤
T , ✓
⇤
T , K
⇤
T ) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h
(1  ⌘(K0 +K⇤T ))(K0 +K⇤T )
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵    KT
 
. (C.31)
In the case where K⇤T is equal to zero and generation capacity will never be added, i.e.,
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✓⇤P (0)=1, the value for the TSO and the PC are equal to:
VTSO(✓
⇤
T ,1, 0) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h1
2
⌘K20 + (1  ⌘K0)K0
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵    K0
 
, (C.32)
and:
VPC(✓
⇤
T ,1, 0) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h
(1  ⌘K0)K0
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵
 
, (C.33)
respectively.
C.3 Sub-problem 3: Both decide timing, while the PC decides
capacity, KT = K⇤P
C.3.1 PC’s investment problem
When the PC has flexibility to decide both timing and capacity, its investment problem at
time zero can be summarised as below:
sup
⌧P ⌧T

max
KP
E
 Z 1
s=⌧T
e ⇢s⇡(✓s, K0)ds
+
Z 1
s=⌧P
e ⇢s[⇡(✓s, K0 +KP )  ⇡(✓s, K0)]ds  e ⇢⌧P  KP
   ✓0  . (C.34)
The solution to this problem is equal to the one derived in Section 5.1.1. The optimal
decision is to expand generation capacity with K⇤P equal to:
K⇤P (✓
⇤
P ) = max
✓
1
2⌘

1   (⇢  ↵)
✓⇤P
 
 K0, 0
◆
, (C.35)
at the moment in time when ✓t first hits ✓⇤P , equal to:
✓⇤P =
8<: ✓ˆ⇤P if ✓<T ✓ˆ⇤P ,✓T if ✓⇤T   ✓ˆ⇤P , (C.36)
where ✓T is the moment in time when the TSO invests in the transmission line and ✓⇤P is
given by the solution to the following implicit equation:
✓ˆ⇤P =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 
1  ⌘(2K0 +K⇤P (✓⇤P ))
. (C.37)
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In the case whereK⇤P is equal to zero, generation capacity will never be added, i.e., ✓
⇤
P (0)=1.
The value of the endogenous constant A1 is equal to:
A1 =
K⇤P (✓
⇤
P )(1  ⌘(2K0 +K⇤P (✓⇤P )))
⇢  ↵
1
 1
✓ˆ⇤1  1P . (C.38)
C.3.2 TSO’s investment problem
The TSO’s investment problem at time zero, when it holds only the option to decide the
timing of investment, is equal to:
sup
⌧T
E
 Z 1
s=⌧T
e ⇢sts(✓s;K0)ds  e ⇢⌧T  (K0 +K⇤P )
+
Z 1
s=⌧P
e ⇢s[ts(✓s;K0 +K⇤P )  ts(✓s;K0)]ds  e ⇢⌧P  K⇤P
   ✓0 . (C.39)
The solution to this problem is equal to Equations (49) and (50) derived in Section 5.1.2,
but with K⇤P instead of K
⇤
T :
B1 =

K0   1
2
⌘K20
 
✓⇤1  1T
 1(⇢  ↵) +

K⇤P (✓
⇤
P )(1  ⌘(K0  
1
2
K⇤P (✓
⇤
P )))
 
✓⇤P (K
⇤
P )
⇤1  1
⇢  ↵
   K⇤P (✓⇤P )✓⇤P (K⇤P )⇤  1 , (C.40)
while ✓⇤T is given by the solution to the following implicit equation:
✓⇤T =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 (K0 +K⇤P (✓
⇤
P ))
K0(1  12⌘K0)
. (C.41)
The only way the TSO can a↵ect the investment decision of the PC, within this set-up, is
by investing later than what is optimal for the PC, and force it to delay its investment. If
the PC would like to invest earlier than the TSO, it will have to wait and the TSOs optimal
investment time will be dominating. In this case, the PC only holds the option to decide
capacity not timing and will have to follow the TSO’s investment timing strategy.
Then the optimal K⇤P will depend on ✓
⇤
T and be given by:
K⇤P (✓
⇤
T ) = max
✓
1
2⌘

1   (⇢  ↵)
✓⇤T
 
 K0, 0
◆
. (C.42)
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To find the TSO’s optimal investment time given that they invest at the same time, we need
to solve the following optimal stopping problem:
sup
⌧T
E
 Z 1
s=⌧T
e ⇢sts(✓s;K0 +K⇤P )ds  e ⇢⌧T  (K0 +K⇤P )  e ⇢⌧T  (K⇤P )
   ✓0 . (C.43)
This solution to this problem is derived in Section B.4 where we get:
B1 =
1
 1

(K0 +K⇤P (✓
⇤
T )(1  12⌘(K0 +K⇤P (✓⇤T )))
⇢  ↵
+
h1  ⌘(K0 +K⇤P (✓⇤T ))
⇢  ↵ ✓
⇤
T        
i 1
2⌘
 (⇢  ↵)
✓⇤2T
 
✓⇤1  1T . (C.44)
Substituting the expression for B1 into the value-matching condition, we get the following
implicit equation for the optimal investment level, ✓⇤T :
 1   1
 1
(K0 +K⇤P (✓
⇤
T )(1  12⌘(K0 +K⇤P (✓⇤T )))
⇢  ↵ ✓
⇤2
T
 

 (K0 +K
⇤
P (✓
⇤
T )) +  K
⇤
P (✓
⇤
T ) +
 (1  ⌘(K0 +K⇤P (✓⇤T ))
2⌘ 1
 
✓⇤T +
 (  +  )(⇢  ↵)
2⌘ 1
= 0.
(C.45)
C.3.3 Optimal investment strategies
The optimal investment strategies for Sub-problem 3 are summarised in Table C.2.
If the PC invests after the TSO, the resulting value at time zero for each agent is equal
to:
VTSO(✓
⇤
T , ✓
⇤
P , K
⇤
P ) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h1
2
⌘K20 + (1  ⌘K0)K0
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵    (K0 +K
⇤
P )
+

1
2
⌘[(K0+K
⇤
P )
2 K20 ]+(1 ⌘(K0+K⇤P ))(K0+K⇤P )  (1 ⌘K0)K0
 
✓⇤P (K
⇤
P )
⇢  ↵
✓
✓⇤T
✓⇤P (K
⇤
P )
◆ 1
   K⇤P
✓
✓⇤T
✓⇤P (K
⇤
P )
◆ 1 
, (C.46)
VPC(✓
⇤
T , ✓
⇤
P , K
⇤
P ) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h
(1  ⌘K0)K0
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵
+
h
(1 ⌘(K0+K⇤P ))(K0+K⇤P ) (1 ⌘K0)K0
i✓⇤P (K⇤P )
⇢  ↵
✓
✓⇤T
✓⇤P (K
⇤
P )
◆ 1
  K⇤P
✓
✓⇤T
✓⇤P (K
⇤
P )
◆ 1 
.
(C.47)
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Optimal investment strategies Sub-problem 3
K⇤P
✓⇤P > ✓
⇤
T
TSO’s optimal strategy:
KT = K⇤P
✓⇤T =
 1
 1 1(⇢  ↵)
 (K0+K⇤P (✓
⇤
P ))
K0(1  12⌘K0)
PC’s optimal decision:
K⇤P = max
✓
1
2⌘

1   (⇢ ↵)✓⇤P
 
 K0, 0
◆
✓⇤P =
 1
 1 1(⇢  ↵)  1 ⌘(2K0+K⇤P (✓⇤P ))
✓P = ✓⇤T
TSO’s optimal strategy:
KT = K⇤P
✓⇤T is given by the following implicit equation:
 1 1
 1
(K0+K⇤P (✓
⇤
T )(1  12⌘(K0+K⇤P (✓⇤T )))
⇢ ↵ ✓
⇤2
T
 

 (K0 +K⇤P (✓
⇤
T )) +  K
⇤
P (✓
⇤
T ) +
 (1 ⌘(K0+K⇤P (✓⇤T ))
2⌘ 1
 
✓⇤T
+  ( + )(⇢ ↵)2⌘ 1 = 0
PC’s optimal decision:
K⇤P = max
✓
1
2⌘

1   (⇢ ↵)✓⇤T
 
 K0, 0
◆
✓P = ✓⇤T
Table C.2: Overview of optimal investment strategies for Sub-problem 3
If, however, it is optimal for the PC to invest at the same time as the TSO, i.e., ✓P (K⇤P ) =
✓⇤T (K
⇤
P ), the value functions simplify to:
VTSO(✓
⇤
T , ✓
⇤
T , K
⇤
P ) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h1
2
⌘(K0 +K
⇤
P )
2 + (1  ⌘(K0 +K⇤P ))(K0 +K⇤P )
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵
   (K0 +K⇤P )   K⇤P
 
, (C.48)
VPC(✓
⇤
T , ✓
⇤
T , K
⇤
P ) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h
(1  ⌘(K0 +K⇤P ))(K0 +K⇤P )
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵    KP
 
. (C.49)
In the case where K⇤P is equal to zero and generation capacity will never be added, i.e.,
✓⇤P (0)=1, the value for the TSO and the PC are equal to:
VTSO(✓
⇤
T ,1, 0) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h1
2
⌘K20 + (1  ⌘K0)K0
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵    K0
 
, (C.50)
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and:
VPC(✓
⇤
T ,1, 0) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h
(1  ⌘K0)K0
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵
 
, (C.51)
respectively.
C.4 Sub-problem 4: Both decide capacity and PC decides timing
while TSO has to invest at time zero
C.4.1 PC’s investment problem
When the PC has timing and sizing flexibility while the TSO has to invest at time zero, the
investment problem of the PC is equal to:
sup
⌧P 0

max
KP
E
 Z 1
s=0
e ⇢s⇡(✓s, K0)ds
+
Z 1
s=⌧P
e ⇢s[⇡(✓s, K0 +KP )  ⇡(✓s, K0)]ds  e ⇢⌧P  KP
   ✓0  . (C.52)
As in Sub-problem 3, the solution to this problem is equal to the one derived in Section
5.1.1. The optimal decision is to expand generation capacity with K⇤P equal to:
K⇤P (✓
⇤
P ) = max
✓
1
2⌘

1   (⇢  ↵)
✓⇤P
 
 K0, 0
◆
, (C.53)
at the moment in time when ✓t first hits ✓⇤P , equal to:
✓⇤P =
8<: ✓ˆ⇤P if ✓0 < ✓ˆ⇤P ,✓0 if ✓0   ✓ˆ⇤P , (C.54)
where ✓ˆ⇤P is given by the solution to the following implicit equation:
✓ˆ⇤P =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 
1  ⌘(2K0 +K⇤P (✓⇤P ))
. (C.55)
In the case whereK⇤P is equal to zero, generation capacity will never be added, i.e., ✓
⇤
P (0)=1.
The optimal value of the endogenous constant A1 is equal to:
A1 =
K⇤P (✓
⇤
P )(1  ⌘(2K0 +K⇤P (✓⇤P )))
⇢  ↵
1
 1
✓ˆ⇤1  1P . (C.56)
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C.4.2 TSO’s investment problem
The TSO’s investment problem now only includes the flexibility to decide on capacity. At
time zero the investment problem is equal to:
max
KT
E
 Z 1
s=0
e ⇢sts(✓s;K0)ds   (K0 +KT )
+
Z 1
s=⌧P
e ⇢s[ts(✓s;K0 +KP )  ts(✓s;K0)]ds  e ⇢⌧P  KT
   ✓0 . (C.57)
The only way the TSO can influence the PC’s investment decision in this case is by investing
in a capacity which is smaller than the PC’s optimal capacity. Making it invest in a smaller
capacity than it finds optimal, will not only a↵ect the size of the PC’s investment, but also
force it to invest earlier as its investment threshold is decreasing in capacity. We assume that
the TSO has the power to a↵ect the PC’s investment decision. Then we need to substitute
the expression for ✓⇤P (KT ) into the total surplus expression, before we maximise it with
respect to KT . We get the same expression for K⇤T , Equation (59), as in Section 5.1.2. K
⇤
T
is equal to:
K⇤T (✓0) = max
 
Kˆ⇤T (✓0), 0
 
, (C.58)
where Kˆ⇤T (✓0) is given by the following implicit equation:
  +

  [2⌘Kˆ⇤T (⌘K0(    2)    + 1) + (2⌘K0   1)(2⌘K0(    2)    + 1])
2(    1)(⌘Kˆ⇤T + 2⌘K0   1)2
+
 
    1 
  
2
 
⇤
(    1)✓0(⌘Kˆ⇤T + 2⌘K0   1)
  (↵  ⇢)
 
= 0. (C.59)
C.4.3 Optimal investment strategies
To find the optimal investment strategies after taking capacity constraints in to account,
we need to compare K⇤T and K
⇤
P to determine which one of them will be dominating. If
K⇤T > K
⇤
P , the PC will expand its capacity with K
⇤
P when ✓t reaches ✓
⇤
P (K
⇤
P ), and the TSO
will have to accept the PC’s optimal investment strategy and that it has no power to a↵ect
it. However, if K⇤T < K
⇤
P the PC will have to accept the optimal capacity of the TSO, and
choose it’s optimal investment time based on K⇤T , ✓
⇤
P (K
⇤
T ). This optimal investment time
will be the same as the TSO took into account when it found its optimal K⇤T . The optimal
investment strategies when K⇤T is the dominating capacity is summarised in Table C.3 while
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the optimal investment strategies when K⇤P is the dominating capacity is summarised in
Table C.4.
Optimal investment strategies Sub-problem 4
K⇤T < K
⇤
P
KP = K⇤T
✓⇤P > ✓0
TSO’s optimal strategy:
K⇤T = max
 
Kˆ⇤T (✓0), 0
 
, where Kˆ⇤T (✓0) is given by the following
implicit equation:
   +

  [2⌘Kˆ⇤T (⌘K0(  2)  +1)+(2⌘K0 1)(2⌘K0(  2)  +1])
2(  1)(⌘Kˆ⇤T+2⌘K0 1)2
+    1     2
 
⇤
(  1)✓0(⌘Kˆ⇤T+2⌘K0 1)
  (↵ ⇢)
 
= 0
✓T = ✓0
PC’s optimal decision:
KP = K⇤T
✓⇤P =
 1
 1 1(⇢  ↵)  1 ⌘(2K0+K⇤T )
✓P = ✓0
TSO’s optimal strategy:
K⇤T = max
✓
1
⌘

1  ( + )(⇢ ↵)✓0
 
 K0, 0
◆
✓T = ✓0
PC’s optimal decision:
KP = K⇤T
✓P = ✓0
Table C.3: Overview of optimal investment strategies for Sub-problem 4 if K⇤T is the domi-
nating capacity
Given the dominating capacity, min(K⇤T , K
⇤
P ), and the resulting investment threshold
for the PC, the social welfare at time zero will be equal to:
VTSO(✓0, ✓
⇤
P ,min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P )) =
h1
2
⌘K20 + (1  ⌘K0)K0
i ✓0
⇢  ↵    (K0 +min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P ))+
1
2
⌘[(K0+min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P ))
2 K20 ]+(1 ⌘(K0+min(K⇤T , K⇤P )))(K0+min(K⇤T , K⇤P )) (1 ⌘K0)K0
 
⇤
✓⇤P (min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P ))
⇢  ↵
✓
✓0
✓⇤P (min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P ))
◆ 1
   min(K⇤T , KP )⇤
✓
✓0
✓⇤P (min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P ))
◆ 1
,
(C.60)
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Optimal investment strategies Sub-problem 4
K⇤P  K⇤T
KT = K⇤P
✓⇤P > ✓0
TSO’s optimal strategy:
KT = K⇤P
✓T = ✓0
PC’s optimal decision:
K⇤P = max
✓
1
2⌘

1   (⇢ ↵)✓⇤P
 
 K0, 0
◆
✓⇤P =
 1
 1 1(⇢  ↵)  1 ⌘(2K0+K⇤P (✓⇤P ))
✓P = ✓0
TSO’s optimal strategy:
KT = K⇤P
✓T = ✓0
PC’s optimal decision:
K⇤P = max
✓
1
2⌘

1   (⇢ ↵)✓0
 
 K0, 0
◆
✓P = ✓0
Table C.4: Overview of optimal investment strategies for Sub-problem 4 if K⇤P is the domi-
nating capacity
and the value for the PC at time zero will be equal to:
VPC(✓0, ✓
⇤
P ,min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P )) =
h
(1  ⌘K0)K0
i ✓0
⇢  ↵+h
(1  ⌘(K0 +min(K⇤T , K⇤P )))(K0 +min(K⇤T , K⇤P ))  (1  ⌘K0)K0
i✓⇤P (min(K⇤T , K⇤P ))
⇢  ↵ ⇤✓
✓0
✓⇤P (min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P ))
◆ 1
   min(K⇤T , K⇤P )
✓
✓0
✓⇤P (min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P ))
◆ 1
. (C.61)
In the special case where K⇤T or K
⇤
P is equal to zero, the PC will never expand its capacity
above K0, the present value for the TSO and the PC, given that the TSO invests in K0 at
time ✓⇤T , is equal to:
VTSO(✓0,1, 0) =
h1
2
⌘K20 + (1  ⌘K0)K0
i ✓0
⇢  ↵    K0, (C.62)
VPC(✓0,1, 0) =
h
(1  ⌘K0)K0
i ✓0
⇢  ↵ . (C.63)
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C.5 Sub-problem 5: Both have sizing flexibility, while the TSO
decides timing
C.5.1 PC’s investment problem
When the PC only has sizing flexibility, and has to follow the TSO’s timing decision, the
investment problem of the PC at time zero is equal to:
max
KP
E
 Z 1
s=⌧T
e ⇢s⇡(✓s, K0 +KP )ds  e ⇢⌧P  KP
   ✓0 . (C.64)
The solution to this problem is equal to Equation (13) but with ✓⇤T instead of ✓t:
K⇤P (✓
⇤
T ) = max
✓
1
2⌘

1   (⇢  ↵)
✓⇤T
 
 K0, 0
◆
. (C.65)
C.5.2 TSO’s investment problem
When the PC has to invest at the same time as the TSO, the TSO’s investment problem at
time zero is equal to:
sup
⌧T
"
max
KT
E
 Z 1
s=⌧T
e ⇢sts(✓s;K0 +KT )ds  e ⇢⌧T  (K0 +KT )  e ⇢⌧T  KT
   ✓0 #. (C.66)
If both invest at ✓t, the total expected surplus at time t is given by:
TS(✓t, KT ) =

1
2
⌘(K0 +KT )
2 + (1  ⌘(K0 +KT ))(K0 +KT )
 
✓t
⇢  ↵    (K0 +KT )   KT .
(C.67)
The solution to the inner maximisation problem is equal to the one in Sub-problem 1, see
Appendix C.1 but with but with ✓t instead of ✓0:
K⇤T (✓t) = max
✓
1
⌘

1  (  +  )(⇢  ↵)
✓t
 
 K0, 0
◆
. (C.68)
After having solved for K⇤T , the TSO’s investment problem reduces to:
sup
⌧T
E
 Z 1
s=⌧T
e ⇢sts(✓s;K0 +K⇤T )ds   (K0 +K⇤T )   K⇤T
   ✓0 . (C.69)
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We proceed by following a dynamic programming approach to solve the optimal stopping
problem and find ✓⇤T . The value for the TSO at time t is equal to:
F (✓t, K
⇤
T (✓t)) =
8<: B1✓ 1t if ✓t  ✓T ,TS(✓t, K⇤T (✓t)) if ✓T  ✓t. (C.70)
The value in the continuation region is equal to the value of the option to invest in the
transmission line, while the value in the stopping region is equal to the value of the total
surplus given that they both have invested. The value in the continuation region is derived
by finding the solution to the ordinary di↵erential equation (ODE) that stews from the
Bellman equation:
⇢Fdt = E[dF ]. (C.71)
Standard calculations similar to those in Section 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 are performed, which lead
to the value function stated in Equation (C.70).
The second branch is equal to:
TS(✓t, K
⇤
T (✓t)) =

1
2
⌘(K0 +K
⇤
T (✓t))
2 + (1  ⌘(K0 +K⇤T (✓t)))(K0 +K⇤T (✓t))
 
✓t
⇢  ↵
   (K0 +K⇤T (✓t))   K⇤T (✓t). (C.72)
To determine the investment threshold ✓⇤T and the value of the endogenous constant B1,
we employ the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions. First, the value-matching
condition is given by:
B1✓
⇤ 1
T = TS(✓
⇤
T , KT (✓
⇤
T )). (C.73)
When deriving the smooth-pasting condition, we have to take into account that K⇤T depends
on ✓T . We get:
B1 1✓
⇤ 1 1
T =
@TS
@✓t
    
✓t=✓⇤T
+
@TS
@KT
@K⇤T
@✓t
    
✓t=✓⇤T
. (C.74)
However after maximising the total surplus (TS) with respect toKT , we have by the envelope
theorem that @TS@KT = 0. Therefore the smooth-pasting condition reduces to:
B1 1✓
⇤ 1 1
T =
@TS
@✓t
    
✓t=✓⇤T
. (C.75)
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The smooth-pasting condition gives:
B1 =

(K0 +K
⇤
T (✓
⇤
T ))
h
1  1
2
⌘(K0 +K
⇤
T (✓
⇤
T ))
i  ✓⇤1  1T
 1(⇢  ↵) . (C.76)
Substituting the expression for B1 into the value-matching condition and solving for ✓⇤T , we
get that ✓T is given by the solution to the following implicit equation:
✓⇤T =
 1
 1   1(⇢  ↵)
 (K0 +K⇤T (✓
⇤
T )) +  K
⇤
T (✓
⇤
T )
(K0 +K⇤T (✓
⇤
T ))[1  12⌘(K0 +K⇤T (✓⇤T ))]
(C.77)
C.5.3 Optimal investment strategies
The final optimal investment strategy depends on which agent that has the lowest optimal
capacity. If K⇤P is larger than K
⇤
T , the TSO will decide the timing and the size of both
investments. However, if the opposite holds, that K⇤T is larger than K
⇤
P , the PC decides
the size of both investments, while the TSO decides the timing. The optimal investment
strategies when K⇤T is the dominating capacity is summarised in Table C.5 while the optimal
investment strategies when K⇤P is the dominating capacity is summarised in Table C.6.
Optimal investment strategies Sub-problem 5
K⇤T < K
⇤
P
KP = K⇤T ✓P = ✓
⇤
T
TSO’s optimal strategy:
K⇤T = max
✓
1
⌘

1  ( + )(⇢ ↵)✓⇤T
 
 K0, 0
◆
✓⇤T =
 1
 1 1(⇢  ↵)
 (K0+K⇤T (✓
⇤
T ))+ K
⇤
T (✓
⇤
T )
(K0+K⇤T (✓
⇤
T ))[1  12⌘(K0+K⇤T (✓⇤T ))]
PC’s optimal decision:
KP = K⇤T
✓P = ✓⇤T
Table C.5: Overview of optimal investment strategies for Sub-problem 5 if K⇤P is the domi-
nating capacity
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Optimal investment strategies Sub-problem 5
K⇤P  K⇤T
KT = K⇤P ✓P = ✓
⇤
T
TSO’s optimal strategy:
KT = K⇤P
✓⇤T =
 1
 1 1(⇢  ↵)
 (K0+K⇤P (✓
⇤
T ))+ K
⇤
P (✓
⇤
T )
(K0+K⇤P (✓
⇤
T ))[1  12⌘(K0+K⇤P (✓⇤T ))]
PC’s optimal decision:
K⇤P = max
✓
1
2⌘

1   (⇢ ↵)✓⇤T
 
 K0, 0
◆
✓P = ✓⇤T
Table C.6: Overview of optimal investment strategies for Sub-problem 5 if K⇤T is the domi-
nating capacity
The resulting social welfare for the TSO will be:
VTSO(✓
⇤
T , ✓
⇤
T ,min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P )) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T (min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P ))
◆ 1h1
2
⌘(K0 +min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P ))
2
+ (1  ⌘(K0 +min(K⇤T , K⇤P )))(K0 +min(K⇤T , K⇤P ))
i✓⇤T (min(K⇤T , K⇤P ))
⇢  ↵
   (K0 +min(K⇤T , K⇤P ))   min(K⇤T , K⇤P )
 
. (C.78)
And the value of the PC:
VPC(✓
⇤
T , ✓
⇤
T ,min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P )) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T (min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P ))
◆ 1
⇤h
(1  ⌘(K0 +min(K⇤T , K⇤P )))(K0 +min(K⇤T , K⇤P ))
i✓⇤T (min(K⇤T , K⇤P ))
⇢  ↵    min(K
⇤
T , K
⇤
P )
 
.
(C.79)
If K⇤T or K
⇤
P is equal to zero, the PC will never expand its capacity above K0, then the
present value for the TSO and the PC, given that the TSO invests in K0 at time ✓⇤T , is equal
to:
VTSO(✓
⇤
T ,1, 0) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h1
2
⌘K20 + (1  ⌘K0)K0
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵    K0
 
, (C.80)
VPC(✓
⇤
T ,1, 0) =
✓
✓0
✓⇤T
◆ 1h
(1  ⌘K0)K0
i ✓⇤T
⇢  ↵
 
. (C.81)
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